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Does Garbage Have Standing?*:
Democracy, Flow Control and a
Principled Constitutional Approach
to Municipal Solid Waste
Management
MICHAEL D. DIEDERICH, JR.**
Citizens through state and municipal government
should constitutionally be allowed to choose whether to
manage their local waste. For the federal courts to dictate
otherwise allows the garbage industry to trump local demo-
cratic decision making, and therefore profit at the expense
of the American public.
The courts should decline such intrusion. First, sani-
tation is fundamentally a state and local activity protected
by principles of federalism. Consistent with the holding in
Garcia, Congress in RCRA defined the federal/state rela-
* For comparing trees and garbage, I apologize to Christopher Stone,
author of Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural
Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1970). In Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
92 S. Ct. 1361, 31 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972), the Supreme Court declined to grant
majestic old-growth trees standing to challenge the destruction of a forest. This
article varies the theme and suggests that neither garbage, nor its disposal
merchants, have standing under the Commerce Clause to challenge municipal
reduction, recycling, eradication and other management of local solid waste.
** The author is a private practitioner in Stony Point, N.Y. and an Assis-
tant Rockland County Attorney. J.D. Northwestern School of Law, 1980; LL.M.
in Environmental Law, Pace University School of Law, 1992.
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tionship to be primarily non-federal as to non-hazardous
solid waste management.
Second, waste is not in itself a commodity. Rather,
commerce lies only in the commercial disposal service,
which service may never be needed if the waste is munici-
pally managed and disposed of at home.
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I. Introduction
Should America's solid waste destiny, including who
pays the bill, be entrusted to the garbage industry or to the
public? That choice is the focus of this article.
This paper suggests that within our democratic system of
government, local citizens, not the interstate waste industry,
should have the primary role in deciding how to manage local
garbage and other municipal solid waste.' Otherwise, the in-
dustry fox guards the municipal henhouse.2 The waste in-
dustry will increasingly profit by America's failure to control
the generation of volumes of waste, even while local govern-
ments nevertheless remain ultimately responsible for insur-
ing proper waste disposal.
1. In non-legal terms, municipal solid waste can be defined as the things
we throw away, which includes garbage, trash, refuse and rubbish each of
which have somewhat different meanings though used synonymously in casual
speech, and in this article. WiLLiAM RATHJE & CULLEN MURPHY, RUBBISH! THE
ARCHAEOLOGY OF GARBAGE 9 (1992). See also Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act § 1004(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) [hereinafter
RCRA]. Solid waste includes recyclable material, that is, waste which through
some effort can be reprocessed or reused. However, solid waste does not include
material which retains value to its owner, since it is not then waste. For exam-
ple, scrap metal which can be sold for profit or a deposit soda can which is
brought back to a grocery store for a refund.
2. In direct contrast to local government, the garbage disposal industry
has absolutely no financial incentive to reverse trends towards solid waste
proliferation, for it is in their financial interest to allow garbage to engulf the
nation, producing a financial bonanza of increasing demand and decreasing
supply of waste disposal options. Waste reduction and recycling is an anath-
ema to an industry which thrives on increasing volumes of garbage, decreasing
disposal options, and the oligopsonic pricing which may result.
1993]
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The Commerce Clause 3 has been used4 to challenge mu-
nicipal control over managing locally-generated waste. In
particular, the challenge has been against what are termed
flow control ordinances.5 The flow control issue potentially
involves billions of dollars.6 More important, flow control or-
dinances are an essential governmental tool for solid waste
management. The United States Supreme Court is reviewing
one such case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.7
3. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
4. See, e.g., Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775, 785 (D.R.I. 1991), affd, 947 F.2d
1004 (1st Cir. 1991); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641 (D.
Minn. 1992), aft'd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993); Waste Recycling, Inc. v.
Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
5. A flow control ordinance is a local law which directs municipal waste to
designated facilities and applies only to locally generated waste. Twenty five
states which have authorized municipalities to enact flow control ordinances:
COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-107 (1992); CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22A-220A (1993); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6406(31) (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 403.713 (1993); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 340A-3(a) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, para. 5-1047 (Smith-Hurd
1993); IND. CODE § 36-9-31-3-4 (1993); IOWA CODE § 28G.4 (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 30:2307(9) (West 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 1304-B(2)
(West 1992); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.80 (West 1993); Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-
17-319 (1992); Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.202 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-22
(West 1991), 48:13A-5 (West 1993); 1991 N.Y. LAws ch. 569, at 1072-1073; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 130A-294 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE, §§ 23-29-06(6), (8) (1993);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 343.01(I)(1) (Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 268.317(3), (4) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.303(e) (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-19-10(40) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-211-814 (1993); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 2203a-2203b (1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-28.01 (Michie 1993);
WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.58.040 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993), 35.21.120 (West
1990); W. VA. CODE § 24-2-1h (1992); Wis. STAT. §§ 159.13(3), (11) (1992).
In New York, however, flow control ordinances have been written which
authorize direction of waste generated out-of-state to designated facilities. See,
e.g., Rockland County - Solid Waste Treatment and Disposal Act, 1991 N.Y.
LAws ch. 569, at 1072.
6. It has been reported that should the Supreme Court hold that flow con-
trol violates the Commerce Clause, $10 billion in municipal bonds may be at
stake, particularly since many localities are faced with overcapacity in their
waste to energy plants. See Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis
Leaves Incinerators Competing for Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at A1-2.
7. As this article is written, the United States Supreme Court has before it
a case, C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 182 A.D.2d 213, 587
N.Y.S.2d 681, appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 760, 605 N.E.2d 874, 591 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1992), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 124 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993). This
case may ultimately be the vehicle for determining whether local government
can permissibly manage local waste. If the Court rules that a municipality is
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
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Local governments should be allowed to sponsor environ-
mentally sound solid waste facilities, for activities such as re-
cycling and composting. However, many such facilities are
feasible only if a municipality is able to direct or flow8 its
waste to the designated facilities. Otherwise, a multi-million
dollar municipal recycling or composting plant may be built,
but with no waste to process. Each judicial decision which
takes away from a municipality's ability to manage its citi-
zens' waste disenfranchises the municipality's control over
their waste destiny.9
This article proffers that, as to municipal management of
locally generated waste, including flow control, the Constitu-
tion need not, and should not, be interpreted in a manner
which necessitates congressional repair. 10
First, Congress has, for Tenth Amendment purposes, de-
ferred local solid waste management to the States and their
political subdivisions. By its declaration in the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)" that solid waste
management is primarily a non-federal activity, Congress
precluded by the dormant Commerce Clause from directing locally-generated
waste to designated facilities using flow control, then it becomes questionable
whether other waste management devices are permissible, since each type
causes waste to flow to municipally designated facilities. Such types of waste
management devices include solid waste utility, district, franchise or municipal
collection.
8. This can be accomplished through so-called "flow controls" which are
"legal provisions used by local governments to designate where MSW [munici-
pal solid waste] from a specified geographic area must be processed, stored, or
disposed." 58 Fed. Reg. 37,477-79 (1993). EPA's definition may include what
otherwise might be viewed as equivalent alternatives to flow control ordi-
nances, since waste can be flowed to municipal facilities through award of a
franchise, or through municipal collection and disposal, or through municipally-
subsidized pricing (available with a solid waste district or authority) which
makes the local facility the least expensive option.
9. "Waste destiny" encompasses controlling the amount of waste gener-
ated, reused, recycled, landfilled, incinerated and so on, with all attendant costs
including that of environmental protection and cleanup.
10. As discussed throughout this article, there is a paramount need for
waste to be managed closest to home. If a Supreme Court ruling prevents this,
the only responsible response is for Congress to act. As discussed below, legis-
lative proposals have been put forth, and EPA has been directed by Congress to
study the issue.
11. § 1002(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(aX4) (1988).
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has defined the federal/state relationship as to municipal
solid waste management and ceded it to state and local gov-
ernments and their democratic processes. This comports
with the Supreme Court's teachings in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority,12 that the national political
process be used to define the Tenth Amendment. 13 Thus,
Congress has recognized that state and municipal govern-
ments should have a basic and paramount right to manage
their citizens' waste. Moreover, this declaration is consistent
with fundamental constitutional principles of federalism, in-
cluding the promise of a "republican form of government"
found in the Guaranty Clause. 14
A second and independent basis for upholding local
waste management against a Commerce Clause challenge is
that locally generated waste, when municipally managed,
should not be deemed an article of commerce at all. Rather,
waste should be viewed the same as fire and crime, some-
thing to be municipally contained, controlled, and preferably
eradicated. Thus, the waste does not implicate commerce un-
til it is actually placed into the interstate garbage market-
place almost universally as part of a disposal service. This
comports with the common sense notion that waste is not a
commodity, product or raw material, and therefore is funda-
mentally different from bona fide articles of commerce which
are otherwise involved in dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 15
The above is a straightforward judicial approach to local
solid waste management which avoids the need for fact-spe-
cific Commerce Clause review every time a state or municipal
government attempts to manage its citizens' waste. This ap-
proach also reconciles, in large measure, the majority and
12. 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
14. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 ("The United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of
them against invasion. .. ").
15. Allowing local management of local solid waste which has not entered
the channels of commerce has many advantages, the most important of which
is that it allows local democratic decision-making as to solid waste
management.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
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dissenting opinions in City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey16
and its progeny1 7. This approach encourages waste manage-
ment at home, but at the same time does not interfere with
interstate garbage disposal services.
Allowing municipal management of local waste permits
waste self-determination and home rule. This is impaired if
outside interests have a right to locally-generated waste.18 A
principled, logical and comprehensible constitutional ap-
proach to solid waste management is possible only if locally
managed garbage is denied Commerce Clause protection.
Finally, and reassuringly, competing constitutional prin-
ciples, as well as competing policy agendas,1 9 are reconciled
by interpreting the Constitution to allow local management
of endemic waste. 20 There is beauty in simplicity, so perhaps
we should try to beautify the constitutional landscape per-
taining to garbage. Sanctioning local management of local
waste will encourage states and localities to tackle their own
waste dilemmas. 21 It is consistent with RCRA, the Constitu-
16. 437 U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1978).
17. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1992); Chemical Waste Manage-
ment, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1992).
18. If a local community decides to implement "radical recycling" and
thereby attempts to recycle everything in its community, this will be its right.
Any residue left after recycling can then be sent by the community out into the
national garbage marketplace and the protected channels of interstate
commerce.
19. Although not central to this article, competing legislative proposals al-
lowing import bans or taxes, and more recent proposals (due to the flow control
issues) regarding export bans, may become unnecessary if local government is
encouraged (as it is) and fully empowered (as it may not be) to manage its own
waste maximally and then to place the residue into protected channels of inter-
state commerce. See discussion infra parts VI.A and VI.B.
20. If, as recommended in this article, the Court rules in Carbone that local
government can constitutionally manage local waste, this will avoid the neces-
sity of a Congressional fix and may also help reconcile the views of the dissent
and the majority in Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475
(1978); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1992);
Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121
(1992).
21. As discussed further below, the concept that waste is best managed at
or close to the source, the "proximity principle," applies to all waste (solid, haz-
ardous, nuclear) and to the creation of pollution generally. The EPA has also
acknowledged this. See infra notes 183-193 and accompanying text.
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tion, and perhaps even with the Golden Rule22 as applied to
waste: "Dump not upon others that which you would not wish
others to dump upon you."23
II. Garbage Management Basics: A Traditionally
Local Function
Local government has traditionally had a role in solid
waste management. The local garbage dump dates back to
the first prehistoric villages, when human animals became
sedentary animals.24 Site designation was true in colonial
America 25 and has continued.26
Today, we know that municipal waste remains a noisome
pollutant.27 Solid waste mismanagement can result in
groundwater contamination from leaky landfills, 28 rotting
garbage left uncollected on city streets, 29 odors from poorly
22. "In everything, do to others what you would have them do to you...."
Matthew 7:12. See generally 5 BRrTANNICA MICROPAEDIA 341 (15th ed. 1992)
(for universality of the concept).
23. Stated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in less biblical terms, it is "the com-
monsense notion that those responsible for a problem should be responsible for
its solution to the degree they are responsible for the problem but not further."
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2029, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 154 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
24. See, e.g., RATHE & MURPHY, supra note 3, at 9, 33-40.
25. ERNEST S. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT, THE CO-
LONIAL PERIOD 99-125, 258-91 (1938).
26. MARTIN V. MELOSI, POLLUTION AND REFORM IN AMERICAN CITIES 1870-
1930 108 (1980).
27. In a sense, virtually all wastes are pollutants. Industrial pollutants
such as air, water and soil pollution are usually hazardous. Improperly man-
aged human waste can be quite pathogenic. Municipal solid waste has become
a significant source of groundwater contamination as particularly demon-
strated by the new subtitle D regulation. See generally JEFFREY GABA & DON-
ALD W. STEVER, LAw OF SOLID WASTE, POLLUTION PREVENTION & RECYCLING
4.01 (1992). See also Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act § 101(33), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(33) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (for a
definition of "pollutant or contaminant")[hereinafter CERCLA].
28. Additionally, as Chief Justice Rehnquist mentioned in his dissent in
Philadelphia, landfills can create methane explosion hazards, health hazards
caused by rodents, fires and scavenger birds, and can harm aesthetic appear-
ance. 437 U.S. at 630, 98 S. Ct. at 2539, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 486. New subtitle D
regulations will lessen some of these dangers through new municipal solid
waste landfill requirements. See 40 C.F.R. pt. 258 (1992).
29. Labor strikes by garbage collectors can result in uncollected garbage.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
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designed treatment facilities, 30 and medical waste washing
up on beaches, 31 to list a few examples. Add to these the
well-known problems of vermin, pestilence, disease and aes-
thetics, and one realizes why the courts have long recognized
the vital role which local government plays in solid waste
management. 32
Municipal control of fire, police, education and sewer
services are essential public services, are of local concern, and
are traditionally state and local governmental services. 33
Solid waste management is no different. The activity has
long been considered governmental in nature. 34 Local gov-
ernment in some places is required by law to manage commu-
nity solid waste.3 5 The Supreme Court has referred to
sanitation as a traditional function of local government36 and
has upheld its local management.3 7
The object of municipal solid waste management is to
control and eliminate waste, just as fire and police depart-
ments attempt to control and eliminate fire and crime. The
30. Even the state-of-the-art sludge composting facilities have odor
problems.
31. This problem became an important media and political issue during the
summer of 1988 and eventually resulted in the Medical Waste Tracking Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-582, 102 Stat. 2950 (codified in part at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6992 -
6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991)). See also 40 C.F.R. pt. 259 (1988).
32. See Hybud Equip. Co. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th Cir. 1981),
vacated, 455 U.S. 931, 102 S. Ct. 1416, 71 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1982), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1004, 105 S. Ct. 1866, 85 L. Ed. 2d 160 (1985).
33. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854, 96 S. Ct. 2465,
2476, 49 L. Ed. 2d 245, 259-60 (1976) (examples of traditional government func-
tions are fire prevention, police protection, sanitation, hospital services and ed-
ucation). This case was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985).
34. Williams v. Eggleston, 170 U.S. 304, 185 S. Ct. 617, 42 L. Ed. 2d 1047
(1898); William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Applicability of Zoning Regulations
to Waste Disposal Facilities of State or Local Governmental Entities, 59 A.L.R.
3d 1244 (1974).
35. For example, California law directs local government to provide solid
waste handling services. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 40,057 (West 1993).
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
37. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 305, 26
S. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed. 2d 204 (1905); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 26 S. Ct.
106, 50 L. Ed. 2d 212 (1905). See discussion infra notes 80-81, 96-103, 198.
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object is to promote the public welfare, not to earn profits or
promote trade in garbage.
Citizens expect their government to provide for a landfill,
garbage transfer station, and perhaps a recycling facility, just
as they expect government to provide other essential services.
Often, solid waste can be municipally eliminated through
landfilling or incineration. This, of course, makes solid waste
a peculiar object of commerce, whose elimination is en-
couraged or mandated by governmental policy and law.38
Local government has been historically responsible for
supervising solid waste management.39 Whether through in-
cidental regulation of private haulers, or by the award of ex-
clusive or nonexclusive franchises, or by the use of municipal
collection and disposal, the choice has been locally made
through the democratic process.
III. Democracy and Local Solid Waste: Federalism,
Republican Government and the "Invasion of
the Garbage Snatchers"
It is ironic that waste management, often viewed as a
lowly and unesteemed business, implicates some of the most
fundamental aspects of our American system of government.
Municipal solid waste management, in constitutional law
terms, may be seen as pitting the Commerce Clause against
the constitutional principles of federalism, the Tenth Amend-
ment and a basic notion of democratic decision making pro-
tected by the Guaranty Clause.
A. A Republican Form of Government Includes the Right
To Home Rule Over Municipal Waste
Local political judgments regarding waste self-determin-
ism are fast becoming as essential, and costly, as local deci-
sions regarding educating our children and controlling crime
38. See discussion infra part III. Landfill leachate and incinerator ash still
remain. Incinerator ash may still be marketed for a hefty price as hazardous
waste depending on the Supreme Court's interpretation of RCRA. See, e.g.,
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 985 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1993), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2992, 125 L. Ed. 2d 687 (1993).
39. See supra notes 20-23.
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and drugs. Therefore, it is essential to determine who has
the constitutional right to control municipal solid waste-the
garbage industry or the people.
1. The Vitality of Town Hall Democracy in Local
Waste Management
Visualize a local municipal scenario in a fictitious New
England town's democratic solid waste decision making pro-
cess. If the citizens of the town, at a town meeting, vote to
install a $1 million mixed bulky waste recycling plant which
will totally eliminate this type of solid waste from the waste
stream, this should be their democratic right. If one resident
protests the flow control ordinance 40 directing all designated
waste to the recycling plant, because this denies him the
right to sell his old refrigerator or dishwasher to a New
Jersey garbage merchant, he should voice his objection at the
town meeting. If the community elects municipal manage-
ment with flow control, the lone objector's grievance should
not be cognizable under the Commerce Clause. 41 Nor should
a non-resident garbage merchant have standing4 2 to chal-
lenge this democratic decision. Local government should be
permitted to democratically choose local solid waste pro-
grams.43 Garbage should not have standing.44
40. In addition to the goal of managing all the town's construction and dem-
olition, resulting in mixed bulky waste, the flow control ordinance can also be
used to finance the facility by guaranteeing a flow of waste for which a "tip fee"
is paid. However, the same results could also be achieved through municipal
collection, franchising, or the creation of a district.
41. If, for example, the lone objector was an established local scrap dealer,
or otherwise made an investment in self-recycling, there might be present as a
takings or due process claim. This issue is common whenever government re-
places private enterprise with a government monopoly. However, this is be-
yond the scope of this article.
42. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 461, 111 S. Ct. 865, 878, 112 L. Ed. 2d
969, 987 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy articulates a dis-
tinction between standing and causes of action arguing that non-local
merchants have neither standing nor a cause of action, and that local
merchants do not have a cause of action under the Commerce Clause, but may
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in certain situations.
43. Thus, if a county wishes to implement a radical recycling program to
recycle all waste generated in the county (whether by public works or private
bidding), this is its prerogative. If industry wishes to put up an incinerator to
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The other side of the democratic coin is when the citizens
at the town meeting vote to do nothing about their garbage
except to truck it out of town.45 The democratic choice is to
place local waste into commerce. The community then will
depend on the efficacy of the Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot
decisions 46 to prevent other jurisdictions from erecting barri-
ers to this waste, which will allow waste haulers to migrate
freely around the United States searching for the most ad-
vantageous final resting place for their trash.47
A local government may democratically choose to dispose
of its solid wastes locally or to export such wastes into com-
merce. When deciding how to handle its solid waste, a mu-
nicipality must consider many other factors. One concern is
the long-term reliability of the waste disposal service. A com-
munity might rather depend upon its own recycling than rely
on the commercial export market. Another concern is a mu-
nicipality's potential liability under CERCLA. A town must
be concerned about the hazardous substances contained
burn waste for energy, this is its prerogative and should be subject only to ordi-
nary zoning, operational and similar health and safety constraints applicable to
any utility generator. It should not matter that the local jurisdiction has pro-
vided complete waste disposal services for its citizens and has, because of a
county radical recycling program, no need for the additional incinerator for
waste disposal. An analogy would be a water bottling company opening in a
community with municipal water.
44. Granting non-resident waste traffickers the ability to shield local solid
waste from municipal management is analogous to allowing non-resident envi-
ronmental interests standing to protect trees, a concept which was rejected by
the Supreme Court. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S. Ct. 1361, 31
L. Ed. 2d 636 (1972).
45. Al Turi Landfill, Inc. v. Town of Goshen, 556 F. Supp. 231, 232
(S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 697 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1982). The Goshen ordinance was up-
held as nondiscriminatory. This decision may also occur indirectly, for exam-
ple, by enacting a zoning ordinance which limits the amount of available
landfill space.
46. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475;
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
47. To the hauler, this may be the least expensive site. Municipalities, on
the other hand, have become increasingly aware of the potential liability under
CERCLA. Therefore, they tend to avoid what may be, or may become, a
Superfund site because of the potential cleanup liability as a Potentially Re-
sponsible Party (PRP). See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960
(D. Conn. 1991), affd, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992).
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within its municipal waste,48 if it chooses to export this
waste.
Should it simply send its garbage off to the lowest bid-
der? Perhaps not. If the low bidder ultimately disposes 49 of
the waste at a Superfund site, the town could become jointly
and severally liable for a multi-million dollar cleanup.50
It is manifestly democratic to allow local management of
local waste and at the same time prohibit local interference
with waste which has been placed into commerce. To prevent
local management of local waste denies citizens their vote on
a matter of exclusively local concern. In effect, it gives
outside garbage merchants more than a vote, but rather a
veto, by granting them legal standing to assert an entitle-
ment to municipal waste. For practical effect, the garbage in-
dustry is allowed to prevent its object of trade from being
locally reused, recycled or eradicated. 51 This disenfranchises
local citizens of waste management, and therefore deprives
them of a "republican form of government" guaranteed by the
Constitution.52
48. Municipal solid waste (MSW) contains what is termed "household haz-
ardous waste," which includes such items as household cleaners, varnish re-
movers, paints and pesticides. It may contain other hazardous substances. The
EPA has proposed the "Four Percent (4%) Rule", which assumes four percent of
MSW to be hazardous.
49. See Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth.,
814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (prohibiting any "downstream" regulation of
the waste). The court failed to distinguish hazardous waste under RCRA with
hazardous substances under CERCLA, the disposal of the latter of which can
result in unlimited, strict, joint and several liability. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
50. Because of potential CERCLA liability, private industrial and commer-
cial waste generators have become very sensitive to where their waste ulti-
mately is disposed. In addition to self-interest in avoiding financial exposure is
the moral (and intergenerational) question of dumping waste at another's envi-
ronmentally unsound disposal site.
51. If the Supreme Court were to so hold, would it be possible for a state
with surplus solid waste management facilities to sue a neighboring state to
enjoin its waste reduction, reuse and recycling efforts?
52. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Technically speaking, it is the state which is
deprived through its political subdivisions. See Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988) (the Guarantee Clause offers a better approach to fed-
eralism than does the Tenth Amendment). Cf Community Communications
15
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2. Solid Waste Management Plans, Home Rule
Philosophy, and Democratic Implementation
The concept of local management of local waste is both a
grassroots concept 53 and one which is an integral part of the
state and municipal solid waste management plans (SWMPs)
being developed nationwide. These plans are implemented
locally, through the local democratic process, often at signifi-
cant taxpayer expense.5 4
Although not generally cast specifically in terms of
"home rule,"55 this is an appropriate characterization for both
the planning and the implementation of local solid waste
management. 56 Many states have home rule provisions ap-
plicable to municipal activities. 57 As discussed later in Part
III of this article, home rule is a universal theme in waste
management. It is consistent with the Golden Rule, 58 and
has found expression in international law,59 Supreme Court
Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct. 835, 70 L. Ed. 2d 810 (1982) (home rule
provision in Colorado constitution did not create state action exemption to
Sherman Antitrust Act). See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAw § 5-22, at 394 (2d ed. 1988).
53. Household recycling is a common topic in local newspapers, and there
has been much written on the subject. See, e.g., JENNIFER CARLEss, TAKING OUT
THE TRASH (1992).
54. For example, in Rockland County, New York, the development of its
local solid waste management plan and generic environmental impact state-
ment, which includes a thorough recycling analysis, site study and alternatives
review, costs over two million dollars.
55. But see Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1190-91
(6th Cir. 1981) (the Ohio Constitution's grant of home rule over sanitation was
at issue).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0711 (McKinney 1993) (man-
dating county deference to town and village solid waste management ordi-
nances). See also Matter Contracting Co. v. Greene County, 175 A.D.2d 557,
572 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1991). Of course, where a broader regulation is appropriate,
a county can be given preemptive powers. See, e.g., Rockland County - Solid
Waste Treatment and Disposal Act, 1991 N.Y. LAws ch. 569, at 1072 (flow con-
trol authorization allows courts to preempt town and village ordinances).
57. See, e.g., CoLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 (as amended 1912) (vests in the peo-
ple of every town with a population of 2,000 or more the "full right of self-gov-
ernment in both local and municipal matters").
58. See supra note 18.
59. For example, the proximity principle discussed infra notes 183-193, and
accompanying text.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
1993] DOES GARBAGE HAVE STANDING? 173
cases60 (particularly the dissents),61 and in federal statutes.62
Home rule is embodied in RCRA's explicit deference to the
state and local authority,63 as well as the federal govern-
ment's encouragement of states to adopt solid waste manage-
ment plans.64 The home rule concept is also found in the
attempts of private citizens to recycle their bottles, cans and
newspapers.
Most solid waste planning today derives its authority,
and obtains directives, from the state government. Some
states have required their political subdivisions to undertake
complete responsibility for local solid waste. In New Jersey,
for example, this is accomplished through the formation of 22
planning units,65 each of which is required to undertake a
needs analysis and to provide for waste facilities either
within the planning unit or through intermunicipal agree-
ment.66 Plans which include exportation are disfavored. 67
Ohio's 1988 solid waste disposal statute establishes districts
60. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.
Ct. 715, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1980); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Re-
sources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed.
2d 752 (1983).
61. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, 98 S. Ct. at 2538, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 485
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2128, 119
L. Ed. 2d at 152 (Blackmun, J., joining); Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Hunt, 504 U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2017, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121, 136 (1992).
62. See, e.g., RCRA § 1002, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); CER-
CLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1988 & Supp. III 1991); Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021b-j (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
63. RCRA § 1002(aX4), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) ("[tihe collection and disposal
of solid waste should continue to be primarily the function of state, regional and
local agencies. . . ."). See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE
SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 11 (Feb. 1989) ("[w]hen Con-
gress passed [RCRA], it recognized that state and local governments have pri-
mary responsibility for solid waste management. .. ").
64. See RCRA §§ 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a. See also 40 C.F.R.
pt. 256 (1992) (guidelines for development and implementation of solid waste
management plans).
65. See New Jersey Solid Waste Management Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E
(West 1991).
66. Litigation has resulted from New Jersey's policy to avoid reliance on
out-of-state facilities for long-term disposal. See In Re Long-Term Out-of-State
Waste Disposal Agreement Between the County of Hunterdon and Glendon En-
ergy Co., 568 A.2d 547 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 583 A.2d 337
(N.J. 1990).
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and requires them to plan for the disposal of all in-district
waste.68 Rhode Island also formed a state corporation 69 to
manage all solid waste generated in the state,70 which pro-
vided for complete local management. 71
New York requires planning units to draft solid waste
management plans, including recycling analysis. The waste
exportation option is disfavored.7 2 In New York, waste flow
control has been authorized by special law73 enacted at the
request of the planning unit involved.74 New York's less rigid
structure allows private enterprise to enter the waste dispo-
sal market more easily. This structure also means that the
planning units cannot be certain which components of the
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-19, 13:1E-21 (West 1991), This statute pro-
vides that if New Jersey waste is taken out-of-state for recycling, the residue
must be returned. This provision is indirectly at issue in the Carbone case,
discussed infra part VII.C, since neither the parties in Carbone wish to return
the recycling residue to New Jersey.
68. Ohio also uses a differential fee schedule which differentiates between
in-district, out-of-district and out-of-state waste and also imposes various trans-
portation requirements. The statute was challenged on Commerce Clause
grounds and summary judgment was granted. However, the Sixth Circuit re-
versed, finding triable issues of fact. National Solid Waste Management Ass'n
v. Voinovich, 763 F. Supp. 244 (S.D. Ohio 1991), rev'd, 959 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.
1992).
69. The Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corporation, a public cor-
poration created by an act of the Rhode Island General Assembly. See R.I. GEN.
LAws § 23-19-6 (1989).
70. Rhode Island's flow control law was invalidated in the DeVito case. Ste-
phen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management
Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), affd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
71. The State's attempt to bar exportation of waste, so that the waste would
be totally managed in the state's landfill and other facilities, was preliminarily
enjoined due to the likelihood that the regulation violated the Commerce
Clause. DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 785.
72. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAw ch. 43-B, art. 27 (McKinney 1993).
73. See, e.g., Rockland County - Solid Waste Treatment and Disposal Act,
1991 N.Y. LAws ch. 569, at 1072.
74. In New York, solid waste planning is generally done at the county level
of government. See 40 C.F.R. § 255.20 (1992) (preliminary identification of re-
gions including discussions with cities and counties). See also RCRA § 4006(a),
42 U.S.C. § 6946(a) (1988 & Supp. III) ("the Governor of each State .. . shall
promulgate regulations.. . identifying the boundaries of each area within the
State which . . . is appropriate for carrying out regional solid waste manage-
ment."). See 40 C.F.R. pt. 255 (1992) (identifies regions and agencies for solid
waste management).
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waste stream will be managed by the private sector, and
which components will be managed by the public sector. This
uncertainty makes it exceedingly difficult to size public facili-
ties.75 The United States Supreme Court has recognized this
planning reality, though without offering any solutions.76
This article proposes one.
Each of these state plans demonstrates the local demo-
cratic process at work. New Jersey chose its utility form
largely because of the historical problems of organized crime
and political corruption.7 7 New York planning envisions
merchant and other market participation.78 Rhode Island,
due to its size, operates as a single solid waste planning unit.
These differences reflect democratic choices. Ultimately,
these state and local SWMPs attempt to provide for home
75. For example, there is currently no materials recovery facility (MRF) lo-
cated in Rockland County, New York, with which to recycle residential curbside
recyclables. The County's solid waste management plan envisions the construc-
tion of one large MRF for the County. However, if private industry were sud-
denly to enter the picture with one or more smaller private facilities to take a
portion of the recyclables waste stream, the County's MRF may end up being
oversized. Conversely, if everyone recycles and private industry does not enter
the picture, it may then be undersized.
76. The Court stated:
Although accurate forecasts about the volume and composition of
future waste flows may be an indispensable part of a comprehen-
sive waste disposal plan, Michigan could attain that objective with-
out discriminating between in- and out-of-state waste. Michigan
could, for example limit the amount of waste landfill operators may
accept each year.
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2027, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 151-52.
This solution merely dumps the waste overflow problem onto another juris-
diction's lap to precipitate retaliation through reciprocal volume limitations.
This problem does not result if a state or municipality is allowed to manage its
own locally generated solid waste.
77. The New Jersey garbage industry was long dominated by organized
criminal influences. See Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d
221, 223 (3d Cir. 1985); State v. New Jersey Trade Waste Ass'n, 472 A.2d 1050
(N.J. 1984). Prior to 1970, most solid waste in New Jersey was collected by
private haulers and disposed of at privately owned landfills. However, environ-
mental problems mounted and anti-competitive activities dominated the mar-
ket. New Jersey had a shortage of landfills, thus triggering the possibility of
waste disposal havoc. See A.A. Mastrangelo, Inc. v. Commissioner of Dep't of
Envtl. Protection, 449 A.2d 516, 518 (N.J. 1982); Southern Ocean Landfill v.
Mayor & Council of the Township of Ocean, 314 A.2d 65, 66 (1974).
78. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 103 (Consol. 1993).
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rule over local waste. This is good public policy. However,
home rule democracy requires power, which may be lost if
municipal government is deprived of the ability to handle,
control, process and dispose of local solid waste.
Solid waste services can be provided in various ways
ranging from completely private79 to exclusively municipal
collection and disposal.80 Where the private sector8l is in-
volved, citizens often expect and sometimes demand govern-
mental regulation for both health and safety reasons.82
Other reasons include fiscal concerns associated with collu-
sive bidding and the influence of organized crime. 3
3. Franchise and Monopoly Service - Traditional
Democratic Choices for the Public Welfare
One of the most weighty decisions of local government, in
governing its local problems, is the decision to exclusively
regulate a field formerly governed by the marketplace. But
democratic self-governance allows this for the greater good.
79. See id.
80. Legal authority for municipal collection and disposal, to the exclusion of
private interests, is found in numerous states. See ALAsKA STAT. § 29.35.050(3)
(1992); In re Antone G. Zhizhuzza, 81 P. 955 (Cal. 1905); United States Disposal
Sys., Inc. v. City of Northglenn, 567 P.2d 365 (Colo. 1977); United Sanitation
Servs., Inc. v. City of Tampa, 302 So.2d 435 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cassidy
v. City of Bowling Green, 368 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1963); City of Lake Charles v.
Wallace, 170 So.2d 654 (La. 1965); City of Grand Rapids v. DeVries, 82 N.W.
269 (Mich. 1900); Bellerive Inv. Co. v. Kansas City, 13 S.W.2d 628 (Mo. 1929);
City of Hobbs v. Chesport, Ltd., 417 P.2d 210 (N.M. 1966); City of Rochester v.
Gutberlett, 105 N.E. 548 (N.Y. 1914); Tayloe v. City of Wahpeton, 62 N.W.2d 31
(N.D. 1953); City of Canton v. Van Voorhis, 22 N.E.2d 651 (Ohio 1939); Yohe v.
City of Lower Burrell, 208 A.2d 847 (Pa. 1965); Breckenridge v. McMullen, 258
S.W. 1099 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923); Smith v. Spokane, 104 P. 249 (Wash. 1909).
81. The private sector often provides waste disposal services, even in large
cities. For example, New York City services are mostly privatized but regu-
lated. N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 103 (Consol. 1993). Nevertheless, the public sec-
tor must be available where the private sector is unwilling or unable to act due
to a lack of profitability or labor strikes.
82. Both county health departments and state environmental protection de-
partments commonly regulate the activities of private solid waste businesses.
83. See Trade Waste Management Ass'n v. Hughey, 780 F.2d 221, 223 (3d
Cir. 1985) (discussing the social evils associated with the influence of organized
crime in the solid waste industry); see also EDWIN L. MILLER, JR., SAN DIEGO
DisTmicT ATTORNEY, FINAL REPORT WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC. (1992).
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Exclusive franchises or monopolies of solid waste man-
agement services are means of self-governance. Again, there
may be varying ranges of private involvement. For example,
a municipality may allow private haulers free reign to collect
garbage and recyclables, but cause all or part of the garbage
to be deposited in a public landfill, transfer station, or a re-
cycling facility.8 4 In contrast, a municipality may choose to
handle all aspects itself through municipal waste collection
and disposal, 85 while another community may chose to award
exclusive 86 or non-exclusive franchises.8 7 Franchises or mo-
nopoly service are important democratically chosen munici-
pal solid waste options.
84. See, e.g., ROCKLAND COUNTY INTEGRATED SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
PLAN & GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (N.Y. Sept. 1991).
85. For example, in San Diego County, California, the County Board of Su-
pervisors formally declared through a September 1992 policy statement that
waste disposal assets in the County should be publicly owned, managed and
controlled to best serve the public interest. Cf. New Jersey Solid Waste Utility
Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1E-1 (West 1991) (removing solid waste col-
lection from the purely private sector and subjecting all such activities to public
utility regulation). Under the Solid Waste Management Act, the Utility Control
Act authorizes the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection and
Energy to award waste disposal franchises. Brief of the State of New Jersey as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondent at 6, Carbone (No. 92-1402) (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:13A-5 (West 1993)).
86. The Supreme Court has long recognized the propriety of allowing the
award of an exclusive franchise for the collection and disposal of solid waste. In
California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 26 S. Ct.
100, 50 L. Ed. 204 (1905), the Supreme Court upheld the City of San Francisco's
right against a due process challenge to award an exclusive franchise to collect
all waste generated in the City and dispose of it at a site designated by the City.
The Court regarded this exercise of authority as one "reasonable, necessary and
appropriate, for the protection of the public health and comfort." Id. at 318, 265
S. Ct. at 103, 50 L. Ed. at 210. The citizens of San Francisco chose this option,
which the Supreme Court did not disturb.
87. A non-exclusive franchise allows for private competition while preserv-
ing municipal control in vital areas, such as the choice of local management or
export into commerce, and if exported, the choice of sending the waste to envi-
ronmentally sound disposal sites.
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4. The Guaranty Clause
Our very democracy is impaired if a community (or a
state"") is denied such power and thus prohibited from waste
self-determinism. Local voters should be able to choose to
send their waste to progressive waste facilities, whether local
or out-of-state. Alternatively, local voters should be allowed
to place their waste into the hands of commercial waste
merchants, whether interstate or international. An interpre-
tation of the Commerce Clause which divests citizens of the
ability to control their own waste, particularly in view of the
complicated waste planning involved, is of great importance.
Professor Tribe warns that federal usurpation of local self-
governance is to "restructure the basic institutional design of
the system a state's people choose for governing them-
selves." 9 It is the epitome of antimajoritarianism for the ju-
diciary, under the cover of dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, to deny waste self-determination to local gov-
ernment and its citizens.90 This type of jurisprudence may
"nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday
essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell."91
If local citizens choose to implement an intense recycling
or composting program, using their established institutional
decision-making, such is their democratic right and should
not be open to an outsider's challenge. Outside private
merchants simply should not have standing to challenge local
decisions.
The Guaranty Clause, particularly when viewed with
other constitutional provisions as part of a unified system of
88. State-wide solid waste management should be treated no differently
than local management. If, as in DeVito the state wishes to create a state-wide
authority to manage all waste, then it should be the voters' prerogative.
DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 777. If in-state commercial interests believe that they
deserve a special exemption, they should make this plea in their statehouse.
Neither out of state interests nor the waste itself should have standing to chal-
lenge rational local management of local waste.
89. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 5-23, at 397 (2d ed. 1988) (emphasis omitted).
90. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
91. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775,
102 S. Ct. 2126, 2145, 72 L. Ed. 2d 532, 557 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 52, § 5-23, at 397).
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government, ensures democratic government in the United
States.92 Citizens must be allowed to "retain the power to
govern, not merely administer, their local problems."93 There
is no dispute that garbage is a formidable problem of special
local concern.
Preventing states and their political subdivisions from
acting to solve this problem strikes at the heart of "rule by
the people." Apart from the political question ordinarily asso-
ciated with Guaranty Clause jurisprudence, local governance
depends only upon the judiciary's interpretation of dormant
Commerce Clause applicability to local waste management. 94
At least one commentator has suggested that the Guaranty
Clause allows a more principled approach to federalism than
the Tenth Amendment.95 The Guaranty Clause is an appro-
priate vehicle for analyzing local citizens' right to manage
their own waste.
B. Solid Waste Management is Imperiled if Garbage
Merchants Have Standing Under the Commerce
Clause to Attack Local Waste Solutions
If outside (non-local) trash vendors are permitted to chal-
lenge municipal waste choices because local solid waste man-
agement implicates interstate commerce, there results a
significant litigation risk for any community which may
choose to manage its own solid waste. The mere threat of
such potential litigation will chill waste self-management by
fiscally cautious communities. Even for fearless communi-
ties, the danger of being faced with dormant Commerce
Clause litigation by implementing a multi-million dollar solid
waste management plan with expensive facilities, which liti-
gation might result in less facilities and the obligation to pay
92. The Guaranty Clause also protects against "invasion", which here
might be the "invasion of the garbage snatehers." In interpreting the Com-
merce Clause, it may also be useful to compare the Ninth Amendment: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to
deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. I
93. 456 U.S. at 790, 102 S. Ct. at 2154, 72 L. Ed. 2d at 567.
94. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663
(1962); see also Luther v. Borden, U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
95. See Merritt, supra note 52, at 1.
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the challenger's damages, attorney's fees and costs, is quite
unsettling. When local government is hindered in its efforts
to manage its municipal waste through the prospect of op-
pressive Commerce Clause litigation, its ability to govern is
impeded. The result is a profound threat to autonomous solid
waste decision making.
Commerce Clause litigation is notoriously fact-specific.96
Assuming that interstate commerce is affected, the first ques-
tion to address is which dormant Commerce Clause test to
apply.97 Even if the least restrictive Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.98 balancing test is applied, there is still the risk that the
municipality, faced with the industry's arsenal of economists
and lawyers, might lose the balancing test and therefore be
subject to significant liability. As Justice Kennedy warned in
Dennis v. Higgins,99 major corporations and industry associa-
tions have been able to maintain dormant Commerce Clause
litigations in the past without attorney fee awards. With the
significant economic interests at stake in dormant Commerce
Clause litigation and the resources available to the typical
plaintiff in such cases, there may result a shift in the "bal-
ance of power away from the States and toward interstate
businesses."100 In the solid waste management field, this is
an acute threat.
96. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 462, 470-74,
101 S. Ct. 715, 723, 727-29, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 668, 672-75 (1981), the Court
applied the Pike balancing test to sustain a state law banning the retail sale of
milk in plastic nonreturnable containers after balancing the purposes of the
law: to promote resource conservation, to ease solid waste disposal problems
and to conserve energy against its burden on interstate commerce. Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970).
97. There are several tests ranging from the Pike balancing test, see infra
note 425, to the strict scrutiny test, all the way to a per se invalidation for pro-
tectionist barriers.
98. 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174 (1970).
99. 498 U.S. 439, 464, 111 S. Ct. 865, 880, 112 L. Ed. 2d 969, 989 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 464, 111 S. Ct. at 880, 112 L. Ed. 2d at 989 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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C. Federalism, the National Political Process and RCRA's
Secession of Solid Waste Management Duties to
State and Local Government
1. Federalism and Solid Waste Management
The view that citizens have the democratic right to man-
age their own waste is augmented by both congressional and
judicial recognition that solid waste management implicates
basic principles of federalism.
a. California Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction
Works' 01 and Local Solid Waste Management
Through Flow Control
The Supreme Court, using the language of federalism,
has authorized local solid waste management and flow con-
trol. In California Reduction, the Supreme Court expressly
approved of municipal waste flow control, and explained San
Francisco's power to award an exclusive franchise for waste
collection and disposal in the language of federalism: "it may
be taken as firmly established in the jurisprudence of this
court that the States possess, because they have never sur-
rendered, the power - and therefore municipal bodies, under
legislative sanction, may exercise the power [to award the
franchise]...."102
In California Reduction, the state's device for protecting
its citizens was the award of an exclusive franchise. 10 3 In
other circumstances, a utility model may be appropriate. 10 4
In pointing out the state's sovereign power regarding new
power facilities, in language applicable to solid waste facili-
ties, the Supreme Court stated that the "need for new power
101. 199 U.S. 306, 26 S. Ct. 100, 50 L. Ed. 204 (1905).
102. 199 U.S. at 318, 26 S. Ct. at 103, 50 L. Ed. at 209-10. Cf. Community
Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 102 S. Ct. 835, 70 L.
Ed. 2d 810 (1982) (home rule town not entitled to state's antitrust exemption
because town was not state actor).
103. 199 U.S. at 307, 26 S. Ct. at 100, 50 L. Ed. at 207.
104. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 105 S. Ct.
1713, 85 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1985) (sewage utility); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State
Energy Resources Conservation Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75
L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983) (electric utility).
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facilities, their economic feasibility, and rates and services,
are areas that have been characteristically governed by the
States." 0 5
The same can be said for new solid waste facilities. The
public health and comfort rationale cited in California Reduc-
tion, justifying franchises, utilities and flow control, applies
as well to today's solid waste management problems. 10 6
California Reduction can serve as a cornerstone for
avoiding a potential conflict between the dormant Commerce
Clause and principles of federalism and the Tenth Amend-
ment in matters of solid waste management. The competing
constitutional principles can be reconciled by deeming local
waste managed by state or local government to be essentially
a local matter "for the protection of the public health and
comfort."10 7 Whether based upon principles of federalism,
the Tenth Amendment or the Guaranty Clause, the crux of
the matter is that local solid waste management does not in-
volve an object of interstate trade when locally managed. The
only waste which becomes a subject of dormant Commerce
Clause protection is waste which, for expedience or neces-
sity, 08  is actually placed into the interstate waste
marketplace.
b. The Nuclear Waste Case Law Lessons
Apart from the solid waste arena, the Supreme Court has
permitted state regulation of waste even in the very feder-
105. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 205, 103 S. Ct. at 1723, 75 L. Ed. 2d
at 766 (solid waste language added) (quoting Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278
U.S. 515, 534 (1929)). Justice Brandeis observed that the "franchise to operate
a public utility.., is a special privilege which ... may be granted or withheld at
the pleasure of the State." Frost, 278 U.S. at 534 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
106. California Reduction, 199 U.S. at 318, 26 S. Ct. at 103, 50 L. Ed. at 210.
The Supreme Court has noted the difference between state-sanctioned activi-
ties and those of interstate commerce. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439,
448, 111 S. Ct. 865, 871, 112 L. Ed. 2d 969, 979 (1991) (quoting Crutcher v.
Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57, 11 S. Ct. 851, 853, 35 L. Ed. 649, 652 (1891)
("carry[ing] on interstate commerce is not a franchise or a privilege granted by
the State; it is a right which every citizen of the United States is entitled to
exercise")).
107. California Reduction, 199 U.S. at 318, 26 S. Ct. at 103, 50 L. Ed. at 210.
108. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, 98 S. Ct. at 2538, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
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ally-regulated atomic energy field. With respect to nuclear
waste, the Court in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Development Commission,109 up-
held a nuclear moratorium based upon waste disposal issues,
despite Atomic Energy Act preemption arguments.
The analogy to municipal solid waste is clear. 110 The less
comprehensive the federal regulatory scheme, the more reluc-
tant the courts should be to preempt.11' As discussed later,
the municipal solid waste provisions of RCRA are, at a mini-
mum, very deferential to, and arguably cede power to, state
and local government. The judiciary should defer to state
and local government when exclusively endemic waste man-
agement is involved, as well as decline to use the dormant
Commerce Clause, and so avoid preemption by judicial
interpretation.
The nuclear waste arena has produced another case of
relevance, New York v. United States.1 2 In this case the
Court struck down a portion of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1985113 as being violative of
New York's state sovereignty as defined by the Tenth Amend-
ment." 4 In particular, the Court stated that the "take title"
109. 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983).
110. The Pacific Gas & Electric Co. factors involving nuclear waste are
analogous to those involving simple garbage. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co.,
there was no congressional decision to regulate atomic waste [as with garbage],
nor any prohibition against states locally regulating atomic waste [as with gar-
bage], even though power generation and spent atomic waste [like garbage] are
articles of interstate commerce when placed into the interstate disposal mar-
ketplace. See id. at 199, 103 S. Ct. at 1719-20, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 762. Cf. Philadel-
phia, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475 (waste moving in
commerce); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419-
20, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 140 (1992) (O'Connor, J.) ("[riegulation of the resulting
interstate market in waste disposal is therefore well within Congress' authority
under the Commerce Clause"); Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 214
(7th Cir. 1982) (nuclear waste moving in commerce where the Court considered
state nuclear waste management despite otherwise substantial federal involve-
ment in the nuclear field). The Court should also consider state involvement in
municipal solid waste management.
111. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-27, at 497.
112. 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120 (1992).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 2021(b)-(d) (1988).
114. The Supreme Court found the "take title" provision of the Act unconsti-
tutional. This provision required states to take title and be liable for all low-
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provision would compel states to enact and enforce a federal
program regulating low-level radioactive waste disposal
which would violate New York State's sovereignty. 115
Although Justice O'Connor observed that the "take title" pro-
visions are apparently unique, 116 it may have a fraternal
twin in municipal solid waste management. If the judiciary,
as Congress' dormant Commerce Clause surrogate, are to
prohibit local management of local waste, as has occurred in
several jurisdictions, 117 this effectively creates a "can't take
title" provision.
Inability to take control over solid waste is equally corro-
sive towards state sovereignty as the "take title" provision
concerning spent nuclear waste held unconstitutional in New
York, except that instead of shifting a burden (spent nuclear
waste title and potential liability) from the nuclear waste in-
dustry to the state, 1 8 it shifts a benefit (garbage disposal
fees) from state and local government to the trash trade. In-
stead of forcing states to regulate on behalf of Congress, 119 it
forces them to deregulate on behalf of private industry.
In both instances, there is a loss of accountability to the
local citizenry, exemplified by a federal mandate which com-
pels regulation (nuclear waste) or deregulation (garbage).
Thus, state and local officials will bear the brunt of public
disapproval while the federal officials (administrative or judi-
cial) who devise the scheme remain insulated from the electo-
ral ramifications. 120
However, the scheme is a failure which, through princi-
pled judicial interpretation, need not continue. New York
level radioactive waste generated within the state if the state did not provide
for disposal of their waste by January 1, 1996. Low Level Radioactive Waste
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (1988 & Supp. 1994).
115. Id.
116. 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2428, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 151.
117. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Manage-
ment Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), affd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991);
Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F.
Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F.
Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992).
118. 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2428, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 150.
119. Id.
120. Id. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2424, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 145-46.
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may resuscitate judicial power to invalidate legislation as vio-
lative of the Tenth Amendment, but concerning solid waste
management, no judicial override is necessary. Congress,
through RCRA, has already tendered solid waste manage-
ment to state and local government by defining the federal/
state relationship for purposes of the Tenth Amendment.
2. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority12 1 and the National Political Process:
Keeping and Maintaining Solid Waste Home
Rule at the State and Local Level
The Supreme Court clearly indicated that the Tenth
Amendment has a role in our federal system of govern-
ment.122 However, unless there is present either an ex-
traordinary divesture of state sovereignty such as found in
New York v. United States, or a failure of the political pro-
cess,' 23 the Supreme Court is no longer willing to be the arbi-
ter of power between the federal government and the states
where Congress has affirmatively exercised its powers under
the Commerce Clause. 24
As stated in Garcia, it is now up to Congress to ulti-
mately decide which functions of government will be federal,
and which will be left within the province of state and local
121. 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985).
122. See, e.g., New York, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2429, 120 L. Ed. 2d at
151; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410 (1991);
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 75 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1983); Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7, 95 S. Ct. 1792, 1795 n.7, 44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 369 n.7
(1975).
123. In the dormant Commerce Clause context, the courts are careful to note
discrimination against unrepresented interests. Conversely, "the existence of
major in-state interests affected by the [law at issue] is a powerful safeguard
against legislative abuse." Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S.
456, 473 n.17, 101 S. Ct. 715, 728 n.17, 66 L. Ed. 2d 659, 674 n.17 (1981). See
generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court & State Protectionism: Making
Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1091 (1986).
124. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556, 105 S. Ct. at 1020, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1037; see also
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 512-15, 108 S. Ct. 1355, 1361, 99 L. Ed.
2d 592, 602-03 (1988) (no Tenth Amendment violation where Congress removed
federal income tax exemption on state and local municipal bonds).
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government. 125 Congress has done exactly this with respect
to solid waste management. This is important for both prag-
matic and structural reasons. As the Court stated:
The essence of our federal system is that within the realm
of authority left open to them under the Constitution, the
States must be equally free to engage in any activity that
their citizens choose for the common weal, no matter how
unorthodox or unnecessary anyone else - including the ju-
diciary - deems state involvement to be.126
Structurally, central to defining the federal/state rela-
tionship is the role of the political process. With respect to
the argument that there should be state immunity from con-
gressional legislation when the activity is traditionally local,
the Court stated, "[any rule of state immunity that looks to
the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of govern-
mental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judi-
ciary to make decisions about which state policies it favors
and which ones it dislikes."127
Judicial invalidation of municipal solid waste manage-
ment raises a mirror situation to Garcia: the judiciary is in-
validating state and local legislation by raising a rule of state
non-immunity to the dormant Commerce Clause, even
though Congress has expressly deferred to state and local
governments in this field.1 28 This is judicial intermeddling
with federalism which turns Garcia on its head.
The court went on with a discussion quite apropos to the
developing field of solid waste management:
"The science of government . . . is the science of experi-
ment," . . . and the States cannot serve as laboratories for
social and economic experiment . . . if they must pay an
added price when they meet the changing needs of their
125. 469 U.S. at 549-50, 105 S. Ct. at 1016-17, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1033.
126. Id. at 546, 105 S. Ct. at 1015, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1031.
127. Id.
128. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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citizenry by taking up functions that an earlier day and a
different society left in private hands. 129
3. RCRA Ratifies and Cedes Local Role in Solid Waste
Management
a. A Traditional and Established Home Rule
Activity
Waste home rule, like housekeeping, appears to be a uni-
versally accepted principle and is consistent with the Golden
Rule applied to waste. Congress, through RCRA, has con-
firmed this, by encouraging waste management home rule.
Congress has allowed local government to properly manage
and dispose of endemic waste and to encourage citizens to
generate less garbage. Thus, the tradition of home rule over
garbage is maintained.
Solid waste management has long been a function of, and
reserved to, state and local government. 130 As stated by the
Sixth Circuit,
[Clontrol of local sanitation, including garbage collection
and disposal, like fire and police protection, is a tradi-
tional, paradigmatic example of the exercise of municipal
police powers reserved to. state and local governments
under the Tenth Amendment.... [and which ordinances]
are rationally related to a matter of legitimate local
concern.131
As to local solid waste management, considerations of feder-
alism and the Tenth Amendment clearly outweigh any dor-
mant interest of the Commerce Clause because in RCRA,
129. 469 U.S. at 546, 105 S. Ct. at 1015, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1031 (citations
omitted).
130. HOMER A. NEAL & J.R. SCHUBEL, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: THE MOUNTING GARBAGE AND TRASH CRISIS 3, 14-15 (1987);
Louis BLUMBERG & ROBERT GOTrLIEB, WAR ON WASTE 195 (1989).
131. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1192 (6th Cir.
1981); see also Annotation, Validity of Statutory or Municipal Regulations as to
Garbage, 135 A.L.R. 1305 (1941).
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Congress has explicitly stated the primacy of the non-federal
role.'1 2
b. Expressly a Local Function
The burden of effectively managing solid waste has in-
tentionally not been federalized by Congress. Congress has
expressly declared in RCRA, "the collection and disposal of
solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of
State, regional and local agencies."133
Thus, Congress has clearly not assumed the lead in solid
waste management. 34 Rather, through intentional and ar-
ticulated deference, Congress has unequivocally "reserved to
the states, or to the people" the power of solid waste manage-
ment in a manner which is both permitted under, and which
exemplifies, the Tenth Amendment, principles of federalism
and the Guaranty Clause.
This comports with the traditional role of state and local
government. Even under the plethora of modern federal en-
vironmental law, the task of comprehensive solid waste man-
132. This article suggests that there is no conflict, because local solid waste
management does not implicate the Commerce Clause. However, if garbage is
considered an article of commerce, then a conflict necessarily arises between
the Commerce Clause and constitutional provisions of federalism, particularly
as set forth in the Tenth Amendment, as well as considerations of democratic
government found in the Guaranty Clause. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 8.
133. RCRA § 1002(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 6901(a)(4) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (em-
phasis added). See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID
WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 11 (Feb. 1989). "When Congress
passed RCRA, it recognized that state and local governments have primary re-
sponsibility for municipal solid waste management, but also gave EPA regula-
tory and assistance responsibilities in this area." Id.
134. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 240, 241, 243, 244, 247, 256 (1992) (general
guidelines for solid waste processing). These guidelines are mandated for fed-
eral agencies, but "recommended to State, interstate and local government
agencies." 40 C.F.R. § 240.100(d) (1992). The federal government has assumed
the lead in the area of hazardous waste. Hazardous waste is a subspecies of
solid waste. See RCRA § 1004(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
The term solid waste in ordinary discussion, and as generally used in this arti-
cle, refers to non-hazardous solid waste. In the hazardous waste arena, if states
do not provide assurance of the availability of hazardous waste treatment or
disposal facilities, they will be denied federal remedial action. CERCLA
§ 104(c)(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(9) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
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agement has remained with state and local government, with
federal guidance and assistance. l3 5
c. Congress Has Increased Local Governments'
Powers Over Solid Waste
Congress envisioned a cooperative federal/state/local gov-
ernmental relationship concerning non-hazardous solid
waste management. But the primary responsibility is non-
federal. Moreover, as described below, Congress has actually
expanded local power to manage local solid waste. This con-
gressional action, contained in subtitle D of RCRA, contra-
dicts the garbage industry's notion that the dormant
Commerce Clause should constrain local "hoarding" of
waste.136
Initial federal involvement in solid waste management
began with the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965,137 and the
Resource Recovery Act of 1970.138 RCRA was the first piece
of major federal solid waste legislation and its primary com-
ponent, subtitle C, contained a comprehensive cradle to grave
regulatory program for hazardous waste.139 RCRA also con-
tained a minor component, subtitle D, concerning non-haz-
ardous solid waste. Subtitle D reaffirmed that Congress
intended state and local governments to be ultimately re-
sponsible for solid waste management. 140 Significantly, sub-
135. Id. See generally RCRA §§ 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988 &
Supp. III 1991) (RCRA Subchapter IV - State or Regional Solid Waste Plans).
This is not, however, to say that RCRA or CERCLA authorizes protectionist
state or local laws. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. South Carolina, 945
F.2d 781, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).
136. Local citizens, through their elected representatives, have no reason to
hoard waste. On the contrary, they would prefer there be no waste. However,
responsible local government expends considerable funds to build expensive
waste disposal facilities in order to reuse, recycle and eliminate solid waste, and
consequently directs their waste to facilities built for the purpose of receiving it.
137. Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
138. Pub. L. No. 91-512, 84 Stat. 1227 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
139. See RCRA §§ 3001-3019, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939a (1988 & Supp. III
1991).
140. See RCRA §§ 4001-4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949a (1988 & Supp. III
1991).
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title D encouraged state and local development of
comprehensive solid waste management plans. 14 1 Federal fi-
nancial assistance was also available. 142
Subtitle D enhanced the historical role of local govern-
ment in solid waste management by removing certain obsta-
cles to local management. One such obstacle was state
prohibition against long-term solid waste agreements, partic-
ularly waste supply contracts for resource recovery facilities.
To remove this obstacle, Congress agreed to provide financial
assistance only if the state solid waste management plan
insured,
no state or local government within the State shall be pro-
hibited under State law or local law from negotiating and
entering into long-term contracts for the supply of solid
waste to resource recovery facilities .... 143
The most important effect of this provision was to eliminate
state laws prohibiting local governments from assuring a flow
of waste to local facilities.
Congress also sought to remove other obstacles to local
solid waste management. For example, Congress authorized
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to help State
and local governments remove:
(B) impediments to financing of [energy and materials re-
covery] facilities... through the exercise of State and local
authority to issue revenue bonds and the use of State and
local credit assistance; and
141. RCRA §§ 4006, 4007, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6946, 6947 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
142. RCRA § 4008, 42 U.S.C. § 6948 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
143. RCRA § 4003(a)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 6943(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1991). The
definition contained in RCRA § 1004(11), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(11) (1988 & Supp.
III 1991) states: "The term 'long-term contract' means, when used in relation to
solid waste supply, a contract of sufficient duration to assure the viability of a
resource recovery facility (to the extent that such viability depends upon solid
waste supply)." Of course, Congress has the right to withhold funds if a state
fails to comply with federal directives. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 107
S. Ct. 2793, 97 L. Ed. 2d 171 (1987) (transportation funds conditioned on rais-
ing drinking age to twenty-one years).
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
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(C) impediments to institutional arrangements necessary
to undertake projects .. including the creation of the spe-
cial districts, authorities, or corporations where necessary
having the power to secure the supply of waste of a project,
to conserve resources, to implement the project, and to un-
dertake related activities."'
It is illogical to suggest that Congress desired local gov-
ernment to issue revenue bonds backed by a secured supply
of waste (for example, using flow control) while permitting
the financing of such facilities to be undermined by affording
the interstate garbage industry a right to this waste. EPA
solid waste regulations emphasized that state planning must
reflect a project's financial feasibility. 145 Congress has en-
deavored through RCRA to give municipal governments a
means to solve their individual waste management problems
and it is obvious that in enacting RCRA, Congress envisioned
the necessity that local waste be brought (flowed) to munici-
pal facilities. 146 Congress' efforts to help state and local gov-
144. RCRA § 4008(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6948(d)(3).
145. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 235.10(c) (1992) ("The volume of wastes within a
region will influence the technology choices for recovery and disposal .... ."). See
also 40 C.F.R. § 255.10(a)(1)(c) (a requirement that a region generate sufficient
volume of waste to support its solid waste management plan's objectives).
146. Further support for this view is found in RCRA's legislative history,
where Congress praised the provisions of Wisconsin's waste management plan
which required the use of local facilities to make them financially viable. H.R.
REP. No. 1491, reprinted in 1986 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6240. Wisconsin's statute is sim-
ilar to other states which have authorized flow control at Congressional urging.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-107 (1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22A-220A
(1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6406(31) (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 403.713 (1993);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 340A-3(a) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 34, para. 5-1047
(Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE § 36-9-31-3 to -4 (1993); IOWA CODE § 28G.4
(1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2307(9) (West 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
38, § 1304-B(2) (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 17-17-319 (1992); Mo. REv.
STAT. § 260.202 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-22 (West 1991), 48:13A-5
(West 1993); 1991 N.Y. LAws ch. 569, at 1072-1073; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-294
(1992); N.D. CENT. CODE, § 23-29-06(6), (8) (1993); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 343.01(I)(1)(Anderson 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 268.317(3), (4) (1991); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 4000.303(e) (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-19-10(40) (1992); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 68-211-814 (1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2203a-2203b (1992);
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-28.01 (Michie 1993); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 36.58.040
(1993), 35.21.120 (1990); W. VA. CODE § 24-2-1h (1992); Wis. STAT. § 159.13(3),
(11) (1992).
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ernment to help themselves exemplifies cooperative
federalism.
d. RCRA's Delegation of Waste Management Role
Congress could not intend to grant municipalities solid
waste "collection and disposal" functions yet deny local gov-
ernment, through the dormant Commerce Clause, the finan-
cial ability to perform this function. 147 Yet, this is exactly
what will occur if local government cannot use flow control or
equivalent governmental methods to support municipal solid
waste facilities.
If responsible for collection and disposal of solid waste,
state and local government must have the tools with which to
act or face a constitutional Hobson's choice. Denying state
and local government the power to manage local solid waste
is much more significant than "encouraging each State to ig-
nore the waste problem in the hope that another will pick up
the slack."148 Rather, such disempowerment strikes at the
heart of federalism. It "impair[s] the States' integrity or their
ability to function effectively in a federal system . . .,"149 in
violation of basic principles of federalism and the Tenth
147. The health and safety considerations involved in managing solid waste
should include empowering the locality to finance solid waste management fa-
cilities. Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County, 739 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir. 1984) (hold-
ing regulation allowing denial of permit to landfills that would threaten
revenues of county waste management program to be rationally related to legit-
imate public purpose). Any other interpretation of the Tenth Amendment res-
ervation would render it meaningless.
148. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2030-31, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 156
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
149. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7, 95 S. Ct. 1792, 1795-96 n.7,
44 L. Ed. 2d 363, 369 n.7 (1975) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 52, § 5-20, at 379
n.6). "The [Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." Id. See also Merritt,
supra note 52.
In any case, as recently stated by the Supreme Court: "While no one dis-
putes the proposition that '[tihe Constitution created a Federal Government of
limited powers'. . . the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between fed-
eral and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and
celebrated cases." New York, 505 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2417, 120 L. Ed. 2d at
136-37 (1992) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. -, -, 111 S. Ct. 2395,
2399, 115 L. Ed. 2d 410, 422 (1991)).
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Amendment. It would create the sort of "regulatory vacuum"
which the Supreme Court has sought to avoid, by depriving
local government of the ability to act when the national gov-
ernment declines to act. 150
Through RCRA, Congress has allowed the states to be-
come solid waste laboratories 151 and relinquished to them the
responsibility and ability to experiment in solving the solid
waste crisis. If one state finds the ultimate solid waste "solu-
tion," a means of completely eliminating solid waste, Con-
gress may wish to jump in and adopt the state solution as a
national mandate. 152 And if a solution is found, the state and
local government inventor should look forward to public
praise, not Commerce Clause condemnation. The principles
of federalism deserve no less.
Interpreting RCRA as defining the federal/state relation-
ship, as per Garcia, comports with what has been described
by the Supreme Court as an advantage of a federalist struc-
ture of government:
It assures a decentralized government... ; it increases op-
portunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes;
it allows for more innovation and experimentation in gov-
150. The Court noted, "[I]t is almost inconceivable that Congress would have
left a regulatory vacuum; the only reasonable inference is that Congress in-
tended the States to continue to make these judgments" regarding need, relia-
bility, economic consequences or service shutdowns due to waste disposal
problems, and other economic matters. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 207-
08, 103 S. Ct. at 1724, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 767.
See also TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-27, at 498 (the same sort of regulatory
vacuum occurs if states and municipalities are deprived of the ability to manage
their own waste).
151. Cf. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546, 105 S. Ct. at 1015, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1031;
Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2279-80, 65 L. Ed. 2d.
244, 254 (1980) (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 52 S. Ct.
371, 76 L. Ed. 747 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)) (the court applied the Com-
merce Clause to South Dakota's innovative cement shortage solution would di-
minish the value of the states as social and economic laboratories).
152. Particularly, if a waste solution is discovered, the federal government
may then wish to take the lead, perhaps by imposing appropriate and preemp-
tive uniform regulations. Cf Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass'n, 505 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2374, 120 L. Ed. 2d 73 (1992) (the Court found the
local regulations involving occupational health and safety standards for hazard-
ous waste workers were preempted by federal OHSA regulations).
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ernment; and it makes government more responsive by
putting States in competition for a mobile citizenry. 153
Simply put, Congress has placed the responsibility for
management of local waste upon local citizens and local gov-
ernment. This avoids garbage tyranny, while at the same
time avoiding the lowest common denominator approach to
solid waste management. It also avoids the abdication of lo-
cal responsibility for municipal waste. It disavows a free
market approach to solid waste management, thereby en-
couraging "waste flight" from environmentally sound facili-
ties in a garbage race to the cheapest vendor.154 Free market
waste non-management should not become the judicially-
mandated national standard.155
The Supreme Court has said that "a healthy balance of
power between the states and the Federal Government will
reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."15 6
This balance should be struck in favor of allowing local waste
management. As Alexander Hamilton stated, "in a confeder-
acy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be en-
tirely the masters of their own fate."157 But what federalism
remains if people cannot even be the masters of their own
garbage? 158 Because Congress has spoken in the area of solid
153. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2399, 115 L. Ed. 2d at
422 (referencing Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders'
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987) and Deborah Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLum. L. REV. 1, 3-10 (1988)).
154. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE Di-
LEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1989). The report states that the short-term
solution of waste flight only delays the inevitable management problems in the
locality shipping the waste, and hastens potential problems in the area that
receives and disposes of the waste.
155. This is what is required if the courts impose a free market requirement
on waste management. See DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 779.
156. Gregory, 501 U.S. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2400, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 422.
157. Id. at -, 111 S. Ct. at 2400, 115 L. Ed. 2d at 422-23 (citing THE FEDER-
ALIST No. 28, 180-81 (Alexander Hamilton), "Power being almost always the
rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check
usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition
towards the general government.").
158. Concededly, a legislative fix is always possible. For example, if the law-
making of the federal government (either by congressional legislation or
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waste management, and deferred to the states, the conclusion
drawn must be that the people can be the masters, through
their state and local governments.
Whether based upon the Tenth Amendment, the Guar-
anty Clause or other principles of federalism, it is constitu-
tionally sound to allow local management of waste. Local
control allows the promotion of municipal facilities where
waste can be either eliminated, as through landfilling and in-
cineration, or productively reused, as through composting
and recycling. In either case, the waste is managed at home.
It is municipal waste housekeeping. The first "law of gar-
bage" - that "everyone wants it picked up but nobody wants
to put it down"159 - is solved. As discussed below in Part V,
this local management activity does not implicate interstate
commerce, particularly since the waste may be completely
eliminated as part of the local management.
D. Jurisprudential Considerations
The courts should also be cognizant of the jurispruden-
tial consideration that the central focus of the Commerce
Clause is not to protect individual liberties, but rather, under
the guidance of Congress, to keep the Union an economic
whole. 160 Thus, judicial anti-majoritarianism is dangerous,
for the very reason that the Constitution grants Congress,
not the courts, the express power to regulate commerce.
It is both anti-democratic and contrary to Commerce
Clause jurisprudence for the courts to impose a free mar-
through judicial decision-making) were to promote the generation of garbage
and discouraged waste reduction and recycling, state and local government
would likely lobby for change because they would bear the brunt of the in-
creased disposal costs. As suggested in this article, the Supreme Court can
avoid hindering reuse, recycling and reduction of solid waste by holding local
solid waste management to be constitutionally permissible, either on federal-
ism grounds or Guaranty Clause grounds, by declining to sanctify garbage as
an article of commerce.
159. See, e.g., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, THE SOLID WASTE
DIEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1989).
160. However, individuals can nevertheless obtain relief for violations of the
Commerce Clause. See Dennis v. Higgins, 498 US. 439, 111 S. Ct. 865, 112 L.
Ed. 2d 969 (1991).
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ket 161 mandate upon local government solid waste manage-
ment. The Commerce Clause does not endorse any particular
economic theory.162 Nevertheless, when courts prohibit man-
agement of local waste and instead require such waste to flow
to cheaper out-of-state landfills, they are imposing economic
doctrine. 163
The judiciary should be reluctant to alter the historical
role of local government's solid waste management. If, for ex-
ample, a free market approach to waste management is con-
sidered desirable, this decision should be left to Congress,
which has the staff and resources to make a decision of such
profound national importance. 164 Congress is far better
equipped than the judiciary to either formulate a new na-
tional program, or to leave waste management to the states
as "laboratories of experimentation." 165 The courts should
leave solid waste management to local government which, if
it fails in its mandate, can be preempted by Congress. This is
the constitutional balance which Congress has struck by
161. However, such terminology has infiltrated some of the Supreme Court's
decisions. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432
U.S. 333, 350, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 2445, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 399 (1977) (common mar-
ket); Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370, 96 S. Ct. 923, 927,
47 L. Ed. 2d 55, 60 (1976) (area of free trade).
162. Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation, the American Common Market & Public
Choice, 6 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 119, 121-22 (1982); see also Russell Chapin,
Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause Limitation on State Au-
thority to Regulate, 23 URB. LAw. 163, 175 (1991).
163. See DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 783-85.
164. As stated by one commentator:
Congress has far better staff resources than do the individual
judges who must rely on law clerks unlikely to have a thorough
background in economics. Congress has 30,000 employees, sub-
poena power reaching well beyond the confines of a single litigated
case, and specialized committees and subcommittees to deal with
the specialized subject matter involved. Congress alone can pro-
vide for the full and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and
intricate facts that compose the problem of the regulatory freedom
of the states and the appropriate limits on that authority. It can
give the individual states an adequate hearing, as well as the com-
mercial interests involved, and formulate a policy representing all
concerned.
Chapin, supra note 162 at 180.
165. Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause,
3 CONST. COMMENTARY 395, 414 (1986).
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RCRA, and which the courts should not ignore. 16 6 To do
otherwise may be viewed as "an end run around popular
government."167
IV. Interstate Commerce is Recognizably Distinct
From Local Solid Waste Management
Using only common sense, one would not expect that
backyard composting of leaves, brush or coffee grinds impli-
cates the dormant Commerce Clause. 168 A somewhat larger
leaf, brush and coffee grind composting program imple-
mented by a group of citizens or a village government would
likely be viewed no differently. 169 Extending local recycling
to include local industrial waste, agricultural waste, or junk
cars is merely broadening the scope of the effort, but not its
nature. Local voters or their elected officials can decide that,
for their health, safety and welfare, it is best that all commu-
nity waste go to a municipal facility for environmentally
sound processing and disposal. If the waste is locally landfil-
led, incinerated or composted, there remains no article left to
enter interstate commerce, and thus there is no implication of
the Commerce Clause. The issue of whether municipally de-
stroyed indigenous waste is an article of commerce has rarely
been discussed in court decisions. 170 It should be.171 There is
166. As stated by Justice Black, "A century and a half of constitutional his-
tory and government admonishes this Court to leave that choice [train length]
to the elected legislative representatives of the people themselves, where it
properly belongs both on democratic principles and the requirements of efficient
government." Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 789,
65 S. Ct. 1515, 1530, 89 L. Ed. 1915, 1936 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
167. William Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV.
693, 706 (1976) (referring to dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
168. This is not to say that Congress may not have the power to regulate
such things, but only that until it does, leaves, brush, coffee grinds and other
municipal solid waste do not invoke the dormant or negative aspects of the
Commerce Clause.
169. If one or more citizens wish to compost their leaves elsewhere, this
might involve due process or taking issues, but not the Commerce Clause.
170. See discussion infra Part V.
171. Nothing in this article disputes congressional power to regulate local
solid waste management, at least to the extent that Congress deems such regu-
lation appropriate within the federal system of government. Cf. Wickard v. Fil-
burn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S. Ct 82, 87 L. Ed. 122 (1942) (upholding Congress'
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an essential difference between "waste management" and
"waste commerce".
Though the distinction is not apparent from reported ju-
dicial decisions, there is a fundamental difference between lo-
cal protectionism against interstate trade in waste disposal
services, and local waste management which may eliminate
the need for such services. It helps to first examine the na-
ture of waste.
A. What Is Waste?
The notion that waste is a commodity is counter-intuitive
and oxymoronic. Waste is not non-waste, but rather, by its
very definition, 172 is unwanted by its generator.. In itself,
waste adds nothing beneficial to society or the environ-
ment.173 It is not produced for sale, but is a by-product of
production. Waste is not a manufactured product, but rather,
like fire and crime, is something best prevented or elimi-
power to regulate locally produced wheat, based upon cumulative impacts).
Federal environmental laws and regulation extensively apply to local waste
management activities, for example, MSW landfill requirements, 40 C.F.R. pt.
258 (1992), and proposed new RCRA "subtitle D" regulations, as well potential
liability for municipal waste containing hazardous substances. See, e.g., B.F.
Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992); GABA & STEVER, supra note
27, at § 4.05.
Moreover, Congress need not regulate an article of commerce in order to
regulate matters affecting commerce. See, e.g., Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct.
1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016 (1985) (wages and hours regulation); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 281-83, 101 S. Ct. 2352,
2362-63, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1, 19-20 (1981); Clason v. Indiana, 306 U.S. 439, 59 S. Ct.
609, 83 L. Ed. 858 (1939); Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Douglas, 458 U.S. 941,
102 S. Ct. 3456, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1982) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent). However,
the Supreme Court in Garcia has left defining the federal/state relationship to
the national political process, and thus left with Congress the ability to define
an activity (such as solid waste management) as within the scope of the Tenth
Amendment and therefore outside the scope of judicial power under the dor-
mant commerce clause.
172. See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THmD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 2580 (3rd
ed. 1976) (defines waste as damaged, defective or superfluous material pro-
duced during or left over from a manufacturing process or industrial operation
or refuse from places of human or animal habitation, such as garbage, rubbish,
excrement or sewage).
173. As to beneficial use, there have been various changes to the regulatory
definition of solid waste under RCRA based upon some beneficial use. See gen-
erally GABA & STEVER, supra note 27, at § 2-1.
[Vol. 11
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
1993] DOES GARBAGE HAVE STANDING? 199
nated. There is no social value in its creation, and it costs
money to dispose of.' 74 As far as its generator is concerned, it
is best never created. Therefore, the difference between
waste and commodities, products or raw materials is
fundamental. 175
Broadly speaking, waste can be considered a form of pol-
lution.176 Whether candy-wrapper litter, roadside dumping
of tires or a junkpile, the solid waste involved pollutes the
environment - visually, olfactorily, chemically and
biologically.
Many types of waste are very damaging to the environ-
ment. For example, nuclear and other radiological waste can
emit dangerous levels of radiation for thousands of years. 177
Many types of industrial wastes are exceedingly toxic and can
174. Some by-products can be sold for profit, such as scrap metal, aluminum
and some other recyclables. If there is consistently enough profit, there is usu-
ally a local scrap dealer who usually obtains, through the local political process,
an exemption from local solid waste ordinance. For the purposes of analysis,
material with residual value to the generator should not be considered waste.
See infra note 178.
175. How other nations view waste management is illustrative. European
nations tend to view solid waste as strictly pollution, not a commodity or natu-
ral resource. It is becoming the general policy of the EEC that waste be
processed as near to the point of production as possible. See, e.g., Case C-2/90,
Commission v. Belgium, - E.C.R. - (1993) [Wallonia] (applying proximity
principle; upholding Wallonian import ban against solid waste).
Closer to home, it is significant that negotiations on the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which were concluded August 12, 1992, did
not contain specific environmental standards. The Environmental Side Agree-
ment to the NAFTA, concluded September 15, 1993, provides for an environ-
mental law enforcement mechanism and infrastructure for financing the
cleanup of the US-Mexico border area. These provisions grew out of concern for
Mexico's traditional failure to enforce its environmental laws. If NAFTA, which
was ratified by Congress on November 17, 1993, bestows solid waste with arti-
cle of commerce status, it would further encourage Mexico to participate in the
garbage market, further endangering its environment. See Madnick, Michael
D., Comment, NAFTA: A Catalyst For Environmental Change, 11 PAcE ENVTL.
L. REV. - (1993).
176. Local disposal of waste is not different in kind from permissible local
release of other pollutants. Car exhaust and factory emissions into the air or
water, are wastes also. They are not articles of commerce, whose creation is
encouraged, even though their recapture and recycling might be more cost effec-
tive than minimally controlled release.
177. Nuclear waste is a well known and very controversial form of waste. It
is its own category of waste under federal law, and is not classified as solid
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be released into the environment through air, water or soil
mediums. The chloroflorocarbons (CFC's) contained within
seemingly innocuous household waste such as aerosol sprays
and refrigerants may contribute to potentially catastrophic
stratospheric ozone depletion.
Solid waste is not different in kind from other types of
waste. Waste results from the activities of civilization, but is
something society would rather do without. It is a by-prod-
uct, not a resource. 178 The difference between waste, com-
modities, products and raw materials is significant. Like
anti-matter, waste is the antithesis of useful or beneficial ma-
terial. 179 Consider one form of solid waste, garbage. It at-
tracts vermin, creates fire and explosion risks, and pollutes
the air, soil and groundwater.
The assertion that solid waste is a kind of valuable re-
source is self-serving and inconsistent with the view univer-
sally held (except by the waste generating and disposal
industries) that solid waste is best never produced. This is
not to discourage society from creating less solid waste by
beneficially reusing it.
The argument has been made that waste is an integral
part of a "circle of commerce," wherein "raw materials [are]
harvested, mined and manufactured" into articles of com-
merce, and "thereafter discarded, sorted, recycled, and finally
waste. RCRA § 1003(27), 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1991). However, solid waste
does include medical radiological waste. Id.
178. The solid waste industry has argued that solid waste is a type of natural
resource, for example, as fuel for waste-to-energy plants. See Brief for Amicus
Curie National Solid Wastes Management Association in Support of Petition-
ers, Carbone, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 124 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993) (No. 92-
1402). Of course, this should not discourage society from being less wasteful by
attempting to make beneficial reuse of its waste.
179. This is not snobbishness, or to judgmentally deny that "what is one per-
son's trash may be another's treasure." Rather, it is to say that when there is a
cost imposed for disposal, rather than a sale of material for value, it is waste.
Nor is this to say that waste cannot be productively reused or recycled,
since such is the very purpose of municipal materials recovery and composting
programs and facilities.
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remanufactured yet again ... ."-1o Significantly, this re-
cycling utopia is not inconsistent with existing local manage-
ment of endemic waste. The point is to have the control over
waste necessary to reduce waste volumes, and recycle what is
left. Therefore, in this regard manufacturers and municipali-
ties should be natural allies, and the common enemy exces-
sive waste and waste disposal profiteers.
B. Foreign Nations and Indian Tribes
The Commerce Clause grants Congress power to regulate
commerce not only among the states, but also with foreign
nations and Indian Tribes. How we define solid waste today
may later define the principles of trade with both foreign
countries and American Indians. Thus, it may be informative
to study how others manage solid waste to guide us in formu-
lating our own views.
1. The EEC View of Solid Waste Management
The European concept of solid waste is that it is not a
commodity or natural resource, but rather is unwanted mat-
ter - a form of pollution. As in the United States, the gen-
eral goals are to reduce the volume of solid waste, and reduce
and recycle what remains to the maximum extent feasible. 181
There is a duty of care imposed upon all who handle most
180. See Brief for Amicus Curie National Solid Waste Management Associa-
tion in Support of Petitioners, at 2, Carbone, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 635 (1993) (No. 92-1402).
181. See, e.g., EcKARD REHBINDER & RICHARD STEWART, ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION POLICY 88-100 (European Univ. Instit. 1988). For example, as to
packaging controls Denmark bans one-way beverage containers, and Nether-
lands law provides authority to ban "any product that adds unduly to the
amount of waste, is difficult to dispose of, frequently littered, or is not suffi-
ciently reusable." See Louis BLUMBERG & ROBERT GOTrLIEB, WAR ON WASTE:
CAN AMERICA WIN ITS BATTLE WITH GARBAGE? 281 (1989).
See also Commission v. Denmark, 1988 E.C.R. 4607 (finding returnable
beverage containers law to be disproportionately restrictive, after balancing en-
vironmental objectives against burden on free movement of goods) [hereinafter
Danish Bottles]; Environmental Protection and Free Movement of Goods: the
Danish Bottles Case, 2 J. ENvTL. L. 89 (1990).
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types of waste.'8 2 European Economic Community ("EEC")
member states have a fundamental obligation to ensure that
waste is disposed of without injury to health and the environ-
ment. 8 3 However, there also remains the anti-protectionist
notion that waste which is placed into commerce should not
be arbitrarily impeded at member states' borders. i8 4
It is becoming the general policy of the EEC, as ex-
pressed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and some
member states, that waste be processed as near to the point
of production as possible.18 5 There has been some debate con-
cerning the movement of hazardous waste, with the conten-
tion that such waste is goods within the meaning of the
Treaty of Rome and therefore should be freely traded be-
tween member states.186
In Wallonia,8 7 a recent case before the ECJ, the Court
found that a waste import ban implemented by Wallonia, a
political subdivision of Belgium, interfered with the free
movement of goods concerning hazardous waste, but not ordi-
nary solid waste. As to hazardous waste, the EEC had,
through the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement
of Hazardous Waste and their Disposal and the 1984 Direc-
tive on Transfrontier Movement of Hazardous Waste, created
a comprehensive system of European Community "harmoni-
zation" which preempted the Wallonian hazardous waste im-
port ban.'8 8 However, as to ordinary solid waste, the court
182. See, e.g., Environmental Protection Act, 1990, § 34(1) (Eng.). See gener-
ally ALLEN & OVERY, WASTE MANAGEMENT, THE DuTY OF CARE (1992).
183. Council Directive 75/442 on Waste, 1975 O.J. (L 194) 39; see also,
REHBINDER & STEWART, supra note 181, at 88.
184. See Wallonia, supra note 175.
185. See, e.g., ALLEN & OvERY, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW UPDATE 10 (Jan. 1993).
This is also consistent with the "subsidiarity principle," that governmental ac-
tivity (such as environmental protection) take place at the lowest practicable
level of government. See, e.g., Ludwig Kraemer, The Single European Act and
Environment Protection: Reflections on Several New Provisions in Community
Law, 24 COMMON Micr. L. REV. 659, 665 (1987).
186. ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 182, at 9.
187. Case C-2/90, Commission v. Belgium, - E.C.R. - (1990) (decision of
July 9, 1993 (Fr.)), reprinted in THE TIMES LAW REPORTS (U.K.), 23 July 1993 at
369-371; see also Marina Wheeler, From Danish Bottles to Wallonian Waste,
U.K. ENVTL. L.J., Summer/Autumn 1992, at 26-28.
188. Wheeler, supra note 187 at 26.
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took into consideration the "unique nature of waste" which
required consideration of the principle that environmental
damage should, as a priority, be rectified at the source, and
by implication, that it is for "each region, commune or other
locality to take the appropriate measures to ensure the
proper treatment and disposal of their own waste."189 The
court thus applied the "proximity principle," that waste dis-
posal should take place as close as possible to the place of
production. For these reasons, the Wallonian law was upheld
as to the municipal solid waste management. 190
The Wallonia case did not directly involve the issue of
whether Wallonia could implement a flow control ordinance
to require that Wallonian generated waste be managed at lo-
cally designated facilities. However, this ability was implicit
in the court's approval in applying the self-sufficiency princi-
ple to a sub-European Community level of government. 191
Allowing this local management is consistent with the prox-
imity principle, otherwise enunciated as part of Community
policy.192
It is apparent that the EEC differentiates waste from
commercial products. As seen in hazardous waste law, the
EEC disfavors import barriers which restrict the movement
of waste which has been placed into commerce. This Euro-
pean view corresponds to United States Supreme Court's in
the Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot decisions, regarding waste
which is in commercial transit.
The EEC also favors local management of locally gener-
ated waste (consistent with the Golden Rule as applied to
waste). This corresponds to the Supreme Court's California
Reduction193 and Clason 94 decisions, which recognize the im-
189. Id. at 27.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. See Council Resolution, 1990 O.J. (C 122) 2 (which expresses the desira-
bility that waste materials be prevented at the source, or removed at the closest
suitable facility, and that transportation be kept to a minimum); see also ALLEN
& OVERY, GREEN AND CLEAN IN EUROPE: A CORPORATE COUNSEL's GUIDE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN THE EEC (Feb. 1993) (privately published on file with
author).
193. 199 U.S. at 306, 26 S. Ct. at 100, 50 L. Ed. at 307.
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portance of waste management close to home. 195 The forth-
coming anticipated agreement on intra-Community trade in
waste may ultimately make the above distinction, and per-
haps the United States Supreme Court can help articulate
principled guidance in this area.
The EEC is developing a commercial system similar to
our own American federal system, by encouraging the free
movement of commerce. However, as Wallonia shows, waste
is viewed sui generis. It is treated as environmentally prob-
lematic, where the best solution is to eliminate the problem
closest to the source. If waste self-management results in
"Balkinization," this is intended and desirable since reduc-
tion in waste results in greater economic efficiency for all.19 6
Home rule applied to local waste makes perfect sense, and
the Europeans are beginning to recognize it.
2. Canadian Solid Waste Management
Canadian law and policy is similar to that of the United
States on solid waste management issues.197 This includes
the preference of waste reduction, recycling and reuse, as
well as local management of locally generated waste. 198
If Canada were to fully succeed in managing its own solid
waste, it as a nation would be depriving its southern neigh-
bors of a large potential source of solid waste. It may be use-
ful to study the international trade aspects of this.
If solid waste is deemed an article of commerce, one
might ask whether a home embargo of Canadian solid waste
194. 306 U.S. 439, 59 S. Ct. 609, 83 L. Ed. 2d 858 (1939).
195. See also Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 332, 199 S. Ct. 325, 332, 50
L. Ed. 212, 216 (1905) (describing solid waste collection and disposal as one of
local government's controlling obligations).
196. See, e.g., STEPHAN SCHMIDHEINY, CHANGING COURSE: A GLOBAL Busi-
NESS PERSPECTIVE ON DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (MIT Press 1992).
197. The Canadian definition of waste is pure and simple, and completely
appropriate: "[Waste is] any substance (solid or hazardous) for which the
owner/generator has no further use and which he/she discards." Definition of
Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME), restated in ENvi-
RONMENT CANADA, OFFICE OF WASTE MANAGEMENT, FEDERAL WASTE REDUCTION
12203 PERSPECTIVES 1 (1993). This same publication also commits to adherence
to the polluter pays principle for guiding waste management activities. Id. at 2.
198. Id.
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should be viewed like an embargo of salmon or timber. If
Canada barred its salmon or timber from entering the United
States because of a selfish desire to eat fish and build homes,
retaliation might justifiably ensue. Can the same be said of a
solid waste embargo? The answer is just the opposite.
Nevertheless, assume for a moment that retaliation is an
appropriate sanction. What form should it take? Logically,
the retaliation should be proportional and of like kind. Thus,
if Canada deprives the United States of solid waste by man-
aging its waste internally - using waste reduction, recycling
and reuse - then the United States should do likewise, so as
to completely deprive Canada of our waste! Of course, Can-
ada might retaliate further, by embargoing its hazardous
waste and toxic air and water emissions. The United States
may then impose a punitive sanction, by embargoing its
spent nuclear fuel.
This would be novel, and noble, waste reduction warfare
that would clean up the environment and would be in accord
with classic principles of international environmental law
that 1) states have an obligation to avoid transboundary
harm; 2) that environmental harm may be wrongful; and 3)
that victim states have the legal right to insist on the preven-
tion and abatement of such harm. 199
So perhaps, in our international relations with Canada,
it is best that we consider waste a unique commodity. We can
then clean things up through retaliatory waste reduction
wars, almost holy wars, because they impose the Golden Rule
as applied to waste, as well as the sic utere principle200 of in-
ternational law: the obligation not to use one's property in
such a way as to damage one's neighbors. 20 1
199. See Francois A. Mathys, International Environmental Law: A Cana-
dian Perspective, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L LAw 91, 92 (1991) (citing Trail Smelter Case
(United States v. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1938 & 1941); Corfu Channel Case
(United Kingdom v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (judgment of Apr. 9); Lake Lanoux
Arbitration (France v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (1957)).
200. Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. ("[Olne should use his own prop-
erty in such a manner as not to injure that of another.") BLAcK's LAw DicTioN-
ARY 1380 (6th ed. 1990).
201. See also Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration: "States have.. . the
responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not
1993] 205
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3. The North American Free Trade Agreement
The negotiations on the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), which were concluded August 12, 1992,
did not contain specific environmental standards. Yet, envi-
ronmental considerations were a focal point of discussion.20 2
One concern was the effectiveness of Mexico's environmental
laws, and whether that country might become a "pollution
haven."20 3
Indeed, if Mexico is willing, it could become an exquisite
dumping ground for all North American solid waste in light
of the great expense of landfilling and incineration in the
United States and the dollar's strength against the peso. If
United States law bestows upon solid waste the status of arti-
cle of commerce, there is absolutely no reason why Mexico
should not be entitled to fill up its banks with greenbacks and
its countryside with garbage under the protection of the Com-
merce Clause.20 4 The problem is a moral one. Future gener-
ations from both countries will be ashamed of the narrow-
sighted deed - the act of voluntarily becoming a waste
dumping ground by offering the cheapest repository.20 5
cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction." DECLARATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE HuMAN ENVIRoNmENT, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 48/14 & Corr. 1 (1972), re-
printed in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1420 (1972).
202. See A.B.A. SEC. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT The Year in Review 191-92
(1992).
203. Id. See also Tim Golden, A History of Pollution in Mexico Casts Clouds
Over Trade Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1993, at Al, A7.
204. The Fifth Circuit has recently struck down a Louisiana statute banning
the importation of hazardous waste from foreign countries, as violating the
Commerce Clause. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Templet, 967 F.2d
1058 (5th Cir. 1992).
205. Chief Justice Rehnquist has already raised this argument, in a domes-
tic context: "I see no reason in the Commerce Clause, however, that requires
cheap-land States to become the waste repositories for their brethren, thereby
suffering the many risks that such [landfill] sites present." Fort Gratiot, -
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2030, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139, 155 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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4. Indian Tribes' Solid Waste Management
The Commerce Clause provides that Congress shall have
the power "[t]o regulate commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes."206 Therefore, the dormant aspect of the Commerce
Clause would appear equally applicable to the Native Ameri-
can nations as to the several states. Thus, if Indian solid
waste is deemed an article of commerce, Native Americans
may be required to constitutionally justify any interference
with the exportation of waste from their lands. It would seem
equally peculiar if non-Indian outsiders were permitted to
come onto native lands demanding discarded tribal artifacts
from Indian dumping grounds swinging the sword of the dor-
mant Commerce Clause backed by a potential award of attor-
neys' fees. 207
A different perspective on the same issue arises if Indi-
ans are to become involved in high-tech activities which may
result in waste generation. The Mescalero Apaches have
sought credible, formal discussions with the federal govern-
ment regarding using Indian lands in New Mexico to store
high-level nuclear waste. 20 8 If the tribe accepts the waste
and creates additional non-nuclear solid waste in the process,
how does the Commerce Clause factor into the equation in
this waste management? Presuming that the high-level nu-
clear waste is not locally generated, and so is commerce for
Commerce Clause purposes, 20 9 should the tribe invest any
capital for managing the waste it generates, or will this be
fiscally dangerous because the private sector may be avail-
able to provide the service at a lower cost? Is it prudent for
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
207. Indian nations are not immune from liability for civil rights violations.
It is clearly the law that such attorneys' fees are awardable for violations of the
Commerce Clause. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 464, 111 S. Ct. 865, 879,
112 L. Ed. 2d 969, 989 (1991).
208. See Matthew L. Wald, Tribe on Path to Nuclear Waste Site, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 1993, at A12; Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear Industry Seeks Interim Site to
Receive Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at Al, A20. The rent for such facility
might be $50 million a year. Id. at Al.
209. See Illinois v. General Elec. Co., 683 F.2d 206, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1982)
(interstate transport of spent atomic fuel is protected by Commerce Clause and
it is "irrelevant that traffic is in %bads' rather than goods.").
19931 207
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the tribe to invest in environmentally secure waste facilities
where such waste management by the tribe might later be
viewed as unconstitutionally burdening interstate commerce.
As to both tribal artifacts and high level nuclear waste,
the Indians' managers will undoubtedly prefer managing the
waste they generate without potential judicial interference
under the dormant Commerce Clause. In this way, Native
Americans can take responsibility and be accountable for,
and hopefully take pride in, their waste management
practices. 210
V. Locally Managed Waste Is Not an Article of
Commerce
When household coffee grinds are placed in the backyard
composting pile, the grinds do not become an object of any
trade. Rather there is literal home rule over the internally
generated solid waste. Composting a community's coffee
grinds is no different. Local management, processing, and
disposal of solid waste delays, or prevents, the waste from be-
coming an article of commerce. The local waste collected and
deposited in the local town landfill, or waste locally inciner-
ated or composted, never becomes an object of trade. If the
municipality allows private haulers to collect the waste and
to haul it to a local landfill, there is obviously less restriction
on competition than awarding an exclusive franchise to do
the same. 211 It is also no different from requiring households
210. See Kevin Gover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternal-
ism: One Tribe's Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project
in Indian Country, 63 U. CoLo. L. REV. 933 (1992) (portraying a Native Ameri-
can tribe's effort to use its land as a site for a commercial solid waste landfill in
San Diego County, California, and a discussion of environmental racism).
211. California Reduction v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. at 308, 26
S. Ct. at 104, 50 L. Ed. at 210 (1905). Recently in Hybud, the Sixth Circuit
allowed exclusive franchise for garbage collection and disposal.
Courts in literally hundreds of reported cases have upheld the au-
thority of local governments to monopolize and control local gar-
bage collection by eliminating or restraining competition among
private collectors. If any area of the law can be said to be well set-
tled, this one is.
654 F.2d at 1192. See also EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAw OF MUNICIPAL CoRPo-
RATIONS §§ 24.242, 24.245 (3d ed. 1986).
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to connect to a municipal sewer utility, even if the sewer serv-
ices are privately operated. 212
Sewage is the fraternal twin of solid waste, and cases in-
volving sewer districts are instructive as to the nature of the
municipal activity. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire213
rejected an antitrust challenge to a city's exclusively
franchised sewage collection and disposal system. Though
there was no Commerce Clause challenge as to whether sew-
age should have the constitutional status as an article of com-
merce, there is little difference between garbage and
sewage. 214 Therefore, if out-of-state garbage merchants are
entitled to local waste under the Commerce Clause, septic
and sewage merchants will undoubtedly seek to be next in
line. "Honeydippers" (firms which clean out septic tanks) will
start wearing out-of-state clothing and assert that municipal
sewer systems infringe on their right to trade in this malo-
dorous waste, perhaps insisting that the Constitution guar-
antees the private sector the right to keep citizens' toilets
flushing.
It is well established that local government, when acting
pursuant to state policy, has the power to "displace competi-
tion with regulation or monopoly public service," and thus
avoid the strictures of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 215 This
state action antitrust exemption has evolved from Parker v.
Brown.216 In Parker, the Supreme Court upheld California's
regulation of the raisin market against both antitrust and
Commerce Clause challenges even though eventually 95% of
the raisins sold eventually found their way into interstate
commerce. 217 As part of its decision, the Court in Parker dis-
tinguished between a commodity not yet in commerce and
212. See, e.g., Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) ("While the
operation of the utility is a proprietary activity, the power to compel connection
with the sewer system is a governmental exercise of the State police power");
Village of Peck v. Hoist, 396 N.W.2d 536 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
213. 471 U.S. 34, 105 S. Ct. 1713, 85 L. Ed. 2d 24 (1984).
214. Id.
215. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413, 98
S. Ct. 1123, 1137, 55 L. Ed. 364, 382 (1978).
216. 317 U.S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. Ed. 315 (1943).
217. Id.
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one which iS.2 18 The states retain, said Chief Justice Stone,
"the authority to regulate the commerce with respect to mat-
ters of local concern, on which Congress has not spoken."219
There is a much greater distinction to be made between
local raisins, 95% of which eventually reach interstate mar-
kets, and local solid waste and sewerage, which may reach no
market at all. If locally managed with local disposal (landfil-
led, incinerated, and home-composted), the waste is not pre-
commerce but rather non-commerce. It never becomes an
item of trade. This cannot be said for the raisins in Parker or
any of the other commodity cases. 220
This same distinction was made by (now Chief) Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel Doug-
las.221 The Sporhase case involved groundwater (a commer-
cial commodity much more akin to raisins than garbage) and
Nebraska's efforts to regulate its withdrawal and interstate
transport.222 The majority saw a clear interstate dimension
to the groundwater at issue, since the water was pumped
from a Nebraska well and used to irrigate Nebraska and Col-
orado agricultural lands, both of which grow crops for world-
wide markets.223 Like the trash being moved by the
interstate waste disposal trade in Philadelphia, the Sporhase
Court similarly viewed the groundwater being pumped by
farmers across state borders for the interstate agricultural
markets as an article of commerce. 224
Nevertheless, the Court's ruling in Sporhase left intact
most of the Nebraska statute.225 The Court found only the
reciprocity provision to be discriminatory legislation since it
was not "narrowly tailored to [Nebraska's] conservation and
preservation rationale."226 Therefore, it did not survive the
strict scrutiny test.
218. Id. at 360-61, 63 S. Ct. at 318, 87 L. Ed. at 331.
219. Id. at 360, 63 S. Ct. at 318, 87 L. Ed. at 331.
220. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 254-58.
221. 458 U.S. 941, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1982).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 953, 102 S. Ct. at 3462, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1263.
224. Id. at 961, 102 S. Ct. at 3466, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269.
225. Id. at 960, 102 S. Ct. at 3466, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1268.
226. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 957-58, 102 S. Ct. at 3465, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1265.
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It is significant that only the reciprocity provision con-
tained in the Nebraska statute in Sporhase was invali-
dated.227 Even though the groundwater was unquestionably
an important commodity transported across state borders for
irrigation of agricultural lands, the Court nevertheless
agreed that the Nebraska statute advanced an "unquestiona-
bly legitimate and highly important" purpose to "conserve
and preserve diminishing sources of groundwater." 228 The
Court interjected that "a State that imposes severe with-
drawal and use restrictions on its own citizens is not discrim-
inating against interstate commerce when it seeks to prevent
the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State."229
The Sporhase majority's decision invalidating the reci-
procity provisions can be viewed as ultimately based upon the
interstate dimension of groundwater which was used to irri-
gate transboundary lands for internationally marketed
crops. 230 However, management of local waste is quite dis-
tinguishable from the interstate transport of groundwater
needed as a raw product for crops.
Moreover, the argument made by Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Sporhase, which differentiated between ground-
water and articles of commerce, applies more appropriately to
local solid waste management than to groundwater manage-
ment.231 First, Justice Rehnquist recognized the affirmative
power of Congress when passing legislation: "Congress may
regulate not only the stream of commerce itself, but also ac-
tivities which affect interstate commerce, including wholly
intrastate activities. The activity upon which the regulatory
effect of the congressional statute falls in many of these cases
does not directly involve articles of commerce at all."232
Asserting the proposition that Congress has the power to
regulate even where no articles of commerce are involved,
227. Id.
228. Id. at 954, 102 S. Ct. at 3463, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1262.
229. Id. at 955-56, 102 S. Ct. at 3464, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1264.
230. Id. at 953, 102 S. Ct. at 3463, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1264.
231. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 941, 102 S. Ct. at 3466-68, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
232. Id. at 941, 102 S. Ct. at 3467, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269 (citation omitted).
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Justice Rehnquist cited Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,233 where
the Fair Labor Standards Act was held to apply to employees
who operated and maintained a loft building. Neither the
employees nor the work they performed dealt with articles of
commerce, but because large quantities of goods for inter-
state commerce were produced in the loft, the FLSA ap-
plied.234 Using this example, Justice Rehnquist concluded,
"[t]hus, the authority of Congress under the power to regulate
interstate commerce may reach a good deal further than the
mere negative impact of the Commerce Clause in the absence
of any action by Congress."235
Justice Rehnquist's conclusion is a truism. After Gar-
cia,23 6 Congress can regulate practically anything it chooses.
If the power to regulate is coextensive with the definition of
article of commerce, then everything which federal govern-
ment might conceivably regulate is also an article of com-
merce. 23 7 The dormant Commerce Clause would then reach
anything and everything which a state or a locality may wish
to regulate.238 The practical consequence of a coextensive
Commerce Clause rule is that state and local government
should not regulate anything without first insuring (under
penalty of Dennis v. Hickman239 attorney's fees) that there is
a legitimate public interest outweighing any burden on inter-
state commerce under the Pike balancing test.240 The federal
judiciary will thus be empowered, with only the help of a cre-
ative plaintiff, to micromanage every municipal regulation of
any article of commerce. Such a Commerce Clause rule
might well eviscerate the Tenth Amendment, the Guaranty
Clause and federalism itself.
233. 316 U.S. 517, 62 S. Ct. 1116, 86 L. Ed. 1638 (1942).
234. Id. at 525-26, 62 S. Ct. at 1121, 86 L. Ed. at 1648.
235. Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 961-62, 102 S. Ct. at 3467, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269.
236. See generally Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
105 S. Ct. 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d 1016.
237. Id. at 529, 105 S. Ct. at 1010, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1017.
238. Id. at 528, 105 S. Ct. at 1005, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 1016.
239. See Dennis v. Hickman, 513 So. 2d 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
240. See Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847, 25
L. Ed. 2d 174, 178 (1970).
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Justice Rehnquist made an important distinction be-
tween what Congress can affirmatively regulate under the
Commerce Clause and what the judiciary ought to regulate.
In Sporhase, he accurately states that "Congress arguably
could regulate ground-water overdraft, even if ground water
is not an 'article of commerce' itself."241
Analogous examples of this are found in federal environ-
mental law. Congress does regulate both solid and hazardous
waste, as well as other forms of pollution. Nevertheless, toxic
air or water emissions would be incredulous articles of com-
merce. Hazardous and solid waste are not manufactured for
sale. The commerce involved is the pollution control or waste
disposal services.
Even if pollution and waste were considered resources,
like groundwater, Justice Rehnquist views remain relevant:
[A] state may so regulate a natural resource as to preclude
that resource from attaining the status of an "article of
commerce" for the purposes of the negative impact of the
Commerce Clause. It is difficult, if not impossible, to con-
clude that "commerce" exists in an item that cannot be re-
duced to possession under state law and in which the State
recognizes only a usufructuary right. "Commerce" cannot
exist in a natural resource that cannot be sold, rented,
traded, or transferred, but only used.242
Justice Rehnquist continued, "By contrast, Nebraska so regu-
lates ground water that it cannot be said that the State per-
mits any 'commerce,' intrastate or interstate, to exist in this
natural resource."243 Justice Rehnquist's argument is
equally applicable to municipal management of solid waste,
particularly when the management is total, that is, when the
waste is completely disposed of through landfilling or
incineration. 244
241. 458 U.S. at 962, 102 S. Ct. at 3467, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269.
242. Id. at 963, 102 S. Ct. at 3468, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1270 (emphasis in
original).
243. Id. at 964, 102 S. Ct. at 3468, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1271.
244. Id. at 962, 102 S. Ct. at 3467, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1269.
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This is not a new concept. In Clason v. Indiana,245 the
Supreme Court recognized a state's power to prevent any
trade (intrastate or interstate) in dead animals not slaugh-
tered for food. The state statute required that the animal re-
mains be transported by licensed operators, under strict
sanitary conditions, to a designated disposal facility. 246 The
Supreme Court rejected the Commerce Clause challenge that
this burdened interstate commerce because the state pre-
vented the dead animals from becoming legitimate articles of
commerce.247 The Court stated, "IT]he mere power of the
Federal Government to regulate interstate commerce does
not disable the States from adopting reasonable measures
designed to secure the health and comfort of their people." 248
Thus, Clason directly sanctioned flow control under the
theory that the solid waste (dead animals), locally managed,
did not become an article of commerce and that preventing
the waste from becoming such was an appropriate means to a
lawful end.249 This rationale is equally compelling in the
management of non-animal solid waste.250 Local govern-
ments can manage waste to "secure the health and comfort of
their people."251 Both, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Sporhase, and the Supreme Court's holding in Clason, are
compelling in the context of both solid waste and other forms
of pollution.
The Commerce Clause is inappropriate when applied to
waste and pollution control. To make the point, substitute
"waste and pollution" for "commodity" in Justice Jackson's
classic enunciations of the theory behind the Commerce
Clause:
245. 306 U.S. 439, 59 S. Ct. 609, 83 L. Ed. 2d 858 (1939).
246. Id. at 440-41, 59 S. Ct. at 610, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 859-60.
247. Id. at 443-44, 59 S. Ct. at 611-12, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 861-62.
248. Id. at 444, 59 S. Ct. at 612, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 862; see also Sporhase, 458
U.S. at 941, 102 S. Ct. at 3456, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1254.
249. Clason, 306 U.S. at 444, 59 S. Ct. at 612, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 862.
250. There is no significant difference between dead animals and other forms
of putrescible solid waste, unless the animals have died from infectious disease,
in which case quarantine laws may come into play.
251. Clason, 306 U.S. at 444, 59 S. Ct. at 611, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 862.
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Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that
every farmer and every craftsman shall be encouraged to
produce [waste and pollution] by the certainty that he will
have free access to every [waste and pollution disposal]
market in the Nation, that no home [waste or pollution]
embargoes will withhold his [waste and pollution] exports,
and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations
exclude [the toxic, hazardous and other solid wastes] ....
Such was the vision of the Founders .... 252
Such was surely not the vision of the Founding Fathers. The
Constitution and its Commerce Clause should not be dis-
torted in this manner.
VI. Import Bans, Export Bans, and the Market
Participant Doctrine
Though the distinction is not apparent from reported ju-
dicial decisions, there is a fundamental difference between lo-
cal protectionism against interstate trade in waste disposal
services, and local waste management which may eliminate
the need for such services.
A. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey253 and its Progeny
- Prohibiting Import Tariffs and Protectionists
Quarantines
Before Philadelphia, virtually all dormant Commerce
Clause cases involved articles which had inherent value as
commercial materials, products or raw materials. For exam-
ple, the precedents involving articles of commerce upon
which Philadelphia is based involved items such as milk,25 4
cantaloupes, 255 minnows, 256 shrimp 257 and timber.258 How-
252. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539, 69 S. Ct. 657,
665, 93 L. Ed. 865, 875 (1949) (Jackson, J.) (cited in Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439, 449-50, 111 S. Ct. 865, 872, 112 L. Ed. 2d 969, 980 (1991)).
253. 437 U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1978).
254. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497, 79 L. Ed.
1032 (1935); H.P. Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 525, 69 S. Ct. at 657, 93 L. Ed. at
865 (1949).
255. Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S. Ct. 844, 25 L. Ed. 174
(1970).
256. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 99 S. Ct. 1727, 60 L. Ed. 250 (1979).
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ever, whether or not waste is per se an article of commerce
was not specifically at issue in Philadelphia. Rather, the fo-
cus of the Court's discussion was the evils of protectionism
and invalidity of parochial legislation. 259 These dangers
which may emerge as a result of a state's restrictive solid
waste policies have been reiterated in recent Supreme Court
decisions. 260
Philadelphia properly applied the dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine to interstate waste disposal services, and the
waste being moved as part of these services. The legal pre-
cept that the business of collecting and disposing of solid
waste across state lines constitutes interstate commerce did
not start with Philadelphia.261 Such commercial waste dispo-
sal is an activity which, like any other interstate business,
should not be the object of a state's arbitrary discrimination.
Under the circumstances, New Jersey's argument that com-
mercial waste vendors warrant no Commerce Clause protec-
tion was weak.2 62
In Philadelphia, the Court invalidated New Jersey's at-
tempt to block the movement of solid waste which was indis-
putably being transported in the channels of commerce as
part of the waste disposal service. 263 Similarly, in Fort Gra-
257. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 92 L. Ed. 1460 (1948);
Foster Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S. Ct. 1, 73 L. Ed. 147
(1928).
258. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 104 S. Ct.
2237, 81 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1984).
259. See Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475.
Examples of parochial legislation include assuring "a steady supply of milk by
erecting barriers to allegedly ruinous outside competition .... or to create jobs
by keeping industry within the State[,] . . . or to preserve the State's financial
resources from depletion by fencing out indigent immigrants ... ." Id. at 627,
98 S. Ct. at 2537, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 483 (citations omitted).
260. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S.-, 112 S. Ct.
2009, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1992); Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019,
119 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
261. United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Removal Ass'n, 242 F. Supp. 794
(E.D. Pa.), affd, 357 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961, 86 S. Ct.
1588, 16 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1966).
262. New Jersey's argument that waste merchants have no Commerce
Clause protection because they process waste is somewhat like arguing that
pollution remediation firms have no rights because they trade in pollution.
263. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 98 S. Ct. at 2537, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 483.
60http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol11/iss1/6
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tiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep't of Natural Resources,
the Court was faced with solid waste commercial transactions
which unquestionably [have] an interstate character involv-
ing a disposal service. 26 4 In Chemical Waste Management v.
Hunt, the Court found that an Alabama tax placed only on
out-of-state hazardous waste destined for one of the state's
commercial hazardous waste land disposal facilities violated
the Commerce Clause.26 5 None of these cases involved mu-
nicipal disposal of indigenous waste or whether such local
management involves an article of commerce thus implicat-
ing the Commerce Clause.
Philadelphia, Fort Gratiot and Chemical Waste Manage-
ment v. Hunt do not imply that local government cannot man-
age locally generated waste. In fact, there are indications to
the contrary. 266 Each involved situations in which an outside
jurisdiction or a waste generator could not manage its own
waste, needed to export it, and the interstate market was
264. 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 147.
265. Chemical Waste Management, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2013, 119 L.
Ed. 2d at 129. The Court has elsewhere remarked that, "space in radioactive
waste disposal sites is frequently sold by residents of one state to residents of
another. Regulation of the resulting interstate market in waste disposal is
therefore well within Congress' authority .... " New York v. United States, 505
U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2419-20, 120 L. Ed. 2d 120, 140 (1992) (citing Phila-
delphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475 (1978); Fort
Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 139 (1992)). Obvi-
ously, there is no interstate market in waste when municipal disposal is used
(local landfilling, incineration), because the waste remains with the local
municipality.
266. For example, Philadelphia left open the option of restricting waste facil-
ities to residents, "We express no opinion about New Jersey's power, consistent
with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents access to state-owned
resources ... or... to spend state funds solely on behalf of state residents. . .
437 U.S. at 627 n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 2537 n.6, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 484 n.6.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, ventured that "[o]ther mechanisms
also appear open to Alabama to achieve results similar to those that are seem-
ingly foreclosed today.., subsidies or other tax breaks .... Or... open[ing] its
own facility catering only to Alabama customers." 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2018, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 138 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
A third option, suggested by this article, not only allows private industry to
perform whatever interstate business it wishes to conduct, but also allows the
state to manage waste generated within the state by directing this waste to
designated disposal facilities.
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ready to accept it for a fee. 267 Such commercial facilities exist
because government has not undertaken the disposal of the
waste being generated. If local government had undertaken
the task, it might avoid the need to export the waste through
a commercial disposal service.
It is not difficult to recognize waste which is moving in
interstate channels of commerce. In each instance there is
discarded material, and an entity willing to accept and dis-
pose of the waste for a fee.268 If the waste can be disposed of
on site, or locally, there is no need to send the waste into the
interstate garbage markets and it never need become an arti-
cle of commerce. 269
Both Fort Gratiot and Philadelphia concerned waste
which unquestionably involved interstate commerce (the dis-
posal service) and which was stymied at a border through an
267. As the Court noted in Fort Gratiot, it is really semantics whether to
characterize the interstate transaction as " 'sales' of garbage or "'purchases' of
transportation and disposal services." 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119 L.
Ed. 2d at 147.
268. Some material, such as scrap metal and aluminum containers, can be
sold at a profit by the waste scavenger. If not discarded by the owner generator,
these are not properly considered waste. However, most recyclables are waste
because they require a payment for disposal and ultimate reuse, which is less
than the cost of other traditional disposal, such as landfilling. Thus, recycling
saves the avoided costs of other disposal. Where such avoided cost is possible,
some state statutes require recycling. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAw § 120(aa)
(McKinney 1986).
269. This is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's teachings on the sub-
ject. The Court stated, "All objects of interstate trade merit Commerce Clause
protection; none is excluded by definition at the outset." Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S.
at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023 n.3, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 147 n.3 (citing Philadelphia, 437
U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1978)) (emphasis added). The Court
further stated in Fort Gratiot that "[w]hether the business arrangements be-
tween out-of-state generators of waste and the [private site operator] are
viewed as 'sales' of garbage or 'purchases' of transportation and disposal serv-
ices, the commercial transactions unquestionably have an interstate character."
504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 147. To that extent the
Supreme Court has said that "[we] have reaffirmed the idea that '[s]olid waste,
even if it has no value, is an article of commerce.'" This must be seen in con-
text, that the wastes were moving in interstate trade. Chemical Waste Man-
agement v. Hunt, 504 U.S. at-, 112 S. Ct. at 2012 n.3, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 131-32
(1992) (quoting Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119 L. Ed. 2d at
146-47).
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import ban. 270 Absent court intervention, this interstate dis-
posal commerce would be impaired and perhaps retaliatory
garbage barriers would be imposed by other jurisdictions.
The Commerce Clause seeks to prevent such interference
with "[d]iscriminatory, self-protective, and retaliatory state
actions."271 The waste trade today is a multi-billion dollar
business which is flourishing, and will continue to flourish
with America's throw-away mentality and less than totally
effective waste reduction, reuse and recycling programs.
Therefore, under the Commerce Clause, the garbage trade
can provide services for those jurisdictions and entities which
choose, or cannot avoid, exporting their waste.
It is clear that import restrictions by their very nature
are offensive to interstate commerce. They prevent waste
which is in interstate commerce from finding a home in a pri-
vate landfill in a neighboring state,27 2 or a neighboring
county273, or a foreign country, 27 4 or they impose tariffs
(called disposal fees) not assessed against in-state waste.275
At least prior to Philadelphia and its progeny, import restric-
tions were commonly used to conserve in-state landfills from
being filled with out-of-state waste.276 However, such conser-
vation was at the expense of private enterprise participating
in the interstate garbage disposal trade. The adverse affect
on commerce is obvious.
Professor Laurence Tribe points out, "The states may no
more solve their waste problems by rerouting the market's
270. Fort Gratiot; 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 139;
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475.
271. This is the Madisonian strand of Commerce Clause interpretation. See
TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-3, at 404. A less severe view was Chief Justice Roger
Taney's that the Commerce Clause left the states free to regulate except where
this conflicted with a federal statute. Id. § 6-3, at 405; The License Cases, 46
U.S. (5 How.) 504, 573, 12 L. Ed. 256, 278 (1847) (Taney, C.J.).
272. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475.
273. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 139.
274. See Chemical Waste Management Inc., v. Templet, 967 F.2d 1058 (5th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3498 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1993) (No. 91-3693).
275. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct.
2009, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1992).
276. See, e.g., Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1386 (8th
Cir. 1993).
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allocation of that waste than they may solve their highway
safety problems by routing the market's private participants,
and all their attendant hazards, through neighboring
states."277 He continues, "[t]he Commerce Clause can have
no tolerance for politically expedient decisions 'by one state to
isolate itself in the stream of interstate commerce from a
problem shared by all.'" 278 Import restrictions do not pass
constitutional muster because they are protectionist and
serve to isolate the localities from a common problem. 279
To demonstrate the general offensiveness of import re-
strictions, suppose every municipality in the United States
imposed the relatively trivial requirement that any waste
disposal trucks passing through must stop at a municipal
checkpoint and allow visual examination of the vehicle and
its waste contents. If the garbage were being hauled from
Vermont to a Midwest landfill, this trivial requirement would
require hundreds of stops - obviously an excessive burden
on commerce. 280 Because this requirement would greatly
burden interstate commerce, dormant Commerce Clause
277. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-8, at 425.
278. Id. § 6-8, at 425-26 (citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, 98 S. Ct. at
2538, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 485).
279. In exceptional circumstances, some discrimination is allowed, however,
there must be a legitimate purpose and no reasonable non-discriminatory alter-
natives. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 91 L. Ed. 2d
110 (1986) (upholding ban on importing out-of-state baitfish where ban had le-
gitimate local purpose that could not be served as well by available nondiscrimi-
natory means).
280. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-7 (citing Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 8 S.
Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.)
299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851); Bradley v. Public Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 289 U.S.
92, 53 S. Ct. 577, 77 L. Ed. 1053 (1933); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390,
62 S. Ct. 311, 86 L. Ed. 294 (1941); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. Ed. 734 (1938); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 65 S. Ct. 1515, 89 L. Ed. 1915 (1945); Raymond
Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 98 S. Ct. 787, 54 L. Ed. 2d 664 (1978);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co.,
393 U.S. 129, 89 S. Ct. 323, 21 L. Ed. 2d 289 (1968); Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 101 S. Ct. 1309, 67 L. Ed. 2d 580 (1981)).
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit would apparently allow Georgia counties to
do just that. See Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941, 946
(11th Cir. 1991) (otherwise finding that county importation ban violated the
Commerce Clause).
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scrutiny, either through a Pike balancing test 28 1 , strict scru-
tiny28 2 , or per se invalidity28 3 is applied.
The Commerce Clause theme of Philadelphia and Fort
Gratiot is that parochial restrictions that are protectionist in
nature are improper; it is not that local government is prohib-
ited from solving local waste problems. Professor Tribe's par-
aphrase of a famous summation by Justice Cardozo is
appropriate: "[T]he peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together, even in [our] collective garbage." 28 4 Nonethe-
less, if local government helps its citizens swim through the
management of local solid waste, this cumulatively allows us
all to swim. Whether the task is reducing crime, fire, illiter-
acy or trash, local responsibility and local control will achieve
the best result.
B. Enforced Local Management, Including Flow Control,
Bears Little Resemblance to Import Restrictions
Export barriers pertaining to locally generated waste are
completely different from import restrictions pertaining to
waste which is in the stream of commerce. Export barriers do
not impose one jurisdiction's will upon another. Rather, it al-
lows non-discriminatory taxpayer-financed self-determinism.
Export barriers eliminate waste before the need arises to
place it into commerce or the need for outside disposal
service.
281. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847, 25
L. Ed. 2d 174, 178 (1970); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579, 106 S. Ct. 2080, 2084, 90 L. Ed. 2d 552,
558 (1986).
282. If discrimination is found, strict scrutiny will be applied. See, e.g.,
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 91 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1986).
283. A finding that state legislation constitutes economic protectionism re-
sults in the "virtually per se rule of invalidity." Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624,
98 S. Ct. at 2535, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 481.
284. TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-8, at 426 (paraphrasing Justice Cardozo's
summation in Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523, 55 S. Ct. 497,
500, 79 L. Ed. 1032, 1038 (1935)).
1993]
65
222 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
1. Waste Facility Financing - Community Money for
Environmentally Sound Solid Waste
Management
a. Flow Control
A solid waste export ban is designed to effectuate local
management of local garbage and other locally-generated
solid waste. Generally termed "flow control" or "designa-
tion,"28 5 export bans generally require that locally generated
waste be brought to a local facility, in order to assure that
facility's financial viability.286 Export bans help to foster and
finance proper environmentally sensitive and economical
management of solid waste.
b. Financing Alternatives
In addition to legally compelled export bans, (flow con-
trol), there are other means by which a municipality can con-
trol and manage solid waste. A municipality might create a
refuse entity with either franchised collection, municipal col-
lection or municipally subsidized facilities, as a means of
shepherding local waste to designated facilities. The waste is
either picked up by the municipality, its franchisee or agents,
and delivered to the facility or flows there by force of econom-
ics. Economics, in the form of zero or below-market tip fees,
would be used to direct the flow to a designated facility. In
each case, the waste flow is precisely the same as with a flow
control ordinance; only the methodology is changed by in-
creased bureaucracy. 287
285. Perhaps more precisely, waste flow control means municipal direction
of locally generated solid waste for processing or disposal.
286. Although the terms may be construed broadly to encompass both import
restrictions and export bans, the term "flow control" generally involves only ex-
port bans. See, e.g., Rockland County - Solid Waste Treatment and Disposal
Act, 1991 N.Y. LAws ch. 569, at 1072 ("[authorizing] local laws requiring that
all solid waste generated, originated or brought within [local] boundaries ...
shall be delivered to a specified ... facility").
The purpose of including non-indigenous waste may, however, be permissi-
ble as a legitimate non-discriminatory effort to avoid a generator's intentional
commingling of local and foreign waste for the purpose of avoiding flow control.
287. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated:
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By using any of these methods, local solid waste is di-
rected to designated facilities and, if wholly managed, will
never be placed into commerce. The principle financing dif-
ference is that flow control requires fees to be paid at the
gate, whereas fees supporting a district's facilities, or a mu-
nicipal collection, are collected via a tax bill or assessment.
Because the waste flow results are the same, if export
flow control is invalidated, these other alternatives should
also fail, since they are simply different means to the same
end.288 This conclusion, and the waste havoc which will en-
sue, is the logical result of the twisted reasoning whereby
waste became per se protected commerce.
2. Municipal Waste Facilities Require a Secure Source
of Revenue
A multi-million dollar municipal waste processing or re-
cycling facility is financed through the bond market.28 9
Bondholders want to be assured of repayment, and therefore
study the mechanisms for repayment. They may look to see
whether private facilities are able to threaten the revenue of
the municipal facility.290 However, directing waste to a mu-
nicipal facility, whether through flow control or otherwise,
But certainly we have lost our way when we require States to per-
form such gymnastics, when such performances will in turn pro-
duce little difference in ultimate effects . . . . And each new
arrangement will generate a new legal challenge, one that will
work to the principal advantage only of those States that refuse to
contribute to a solution.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. -, -, 112 S. Ct. 2009,
2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d 121, 138 (1992).
288. As the Court stated in Philadelphia, "[tihe evil of protectionism can re-
side in legislative means as well as legislative ends." 437 U.S. at 626, 98 S. Ct.
at 2537, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 482.
289. Facility financing bonds can be backed several ways: through the mu-
nicipality itself; through general obligation bonds; by the assessments or levies
of a tax district or authority; or by the income generated by facility operations,
generally through tipping fees. The last approach, "revenue financing," is most
common for solid waste facilities.
290. Dirt, Inc. v. Mobile County Comm'n, 739 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th Cir.
1984) (regulation allowing denial of permit to landfills that would threaten rev-
enues of county waste management program rationally upheld as related to le-
gitimate public purpose).
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guarantees a supply of waste to municipal facilities con-
structed to receive such waste.
The practical effect of judicial holdings that localities
cannot constitutionally control locally generated waste is that
it will be impossible to finance municipal facilities. Public
waste management will then become impractical, if not
impossible.
3. Flow Control Is the Best Option
Among the various options for directing waste to envi-
ronmentally sound solid waste facilities, flow control has
many advantages. First, flow control ordinances have the ad-
vantage of administrative simplicity. A local law directs the
waste flow, tip fees are paid at the designated facility and
appropriate environmental enforcement is conducted. In con-
trast, if a solid waste authority or district is formed, authori-
zation may be required at both the state and local levels of
government. In addition, a separate independent adminis-
trative structure must be established, and procedures must
be implemented for imposing special assessments, ad
valorem taxes or user fees.291 This is a much more complex
process, the cost of which will be borne by local citizens.
Besides administrative simplicity, flow control also en-
courages waste reduction. For example, if a composting plant
provides a long-term means of managing local waste in an
environmentally sound manner, the tip fee charged can be set
at an amount which reflects the actual cost of the facility or,
alternatively, the real cost of disposal.292 In this manner, cit-
291. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Murq. LAw § 226(b) (McKinney 1986). For example,
the process for forming a solid waste authority for Rockland County, New York,
is: (1) for the County government to prepare a draft law and request authoriza-
tion from the State; (2) for the state legislature to then enact an enabling law,
which it then refers back to the County; and (3) the County then holds a public
hearing and then forms the authority. Forming a district is similarly complex,
and requires delineation of the service area, establishment of rates, and crea-
tion of an administrative structure.
292. As landfills close and environmental hazards are discovered, waste dis-
posal costs increase. The real cost of disposal must account for these costs, as
well as other possible externalities. For example, deposition at any landfill
which may leak may subject the depositor to the cost of a future cleanup.
Looked at differently, the present disposal fee is subsidized at the expense of
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izens will be encouraged to reduce the amount of their waste
through simple market economics. 293 Conversely, tip fees
might be set at below cost in order to promote composting and
use of the facility. Thus, export flow control can accomplish
two major environmental goals: it can assure long-term
availability of environmentally safe waste management op-
tions, and it can encourage waste reduction, reuse and
recycling.294
4. Total Solid Waste Management: The Destruction of
Non-Commerce
Total waste management of local waste by a municipality
does not discriminate against interstate commerce. Concep-
tually, total waste management by a state or any of its polit-
ical subdivisions, or even a foreign country, 295 should be
viewed no differently. Waste management should not be
viewed as protectionist in terms of interstate commerce.
Such measures, whether through flow control, franchise, pub-
lic utility or municipal collection, ultimately serve to protect
the health, safety and welfare of citizens and the
environment.
Flow control ordinances, in particular, attempt to solve
the solid waste problem at its source by allowing the develop-
the future cleanup. A product tax reflecting the real cost of waste disposal is
one type of market approach. See Britt Anne Bernheim, Note, Can We Cure
Our Throwaway Habits by Imposing the True Social Cost on Disposal Products,
63 U. CoLo. L. REv. 953 (1992).
293. Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993),
affg 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992) (rejecting this concept as interfering with
the interstate flow of waste).
294. Flow control can help accomplish other environmental goals as well: 1)
promotion of energy recovery, 2) controlled inspection and monitoring of waste,
3) providing a guaranteed waste stream and stabilizing the waste market, 4)
encouragement of recycling, reuse and energy recovery technological innova-
tions, 5) avoidance of potential Superfund or other cleanup liabilities, 6) al-
lowing consolidated and therefore reduced truck traffic, and 7) allowing
characterization of waste streams and thus the creation of viable solid waste
management plans.
295. As suggested above, if Canada manages all of its waste internally, this
should not be cause for the United States to retaliate because its waste industry
may be deprived of waste. Rather, we should try then to emulate Canadian
waste reduction.
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ment and financing of locally crafted solutions for the dispo-
sal of locally generated waste. Flow control reflects the real
cost of disposal and has the advantage of administrative sim-
plicity, thereby encouraging waste reduction and recycling.
By comparison, restricting out-of-jurisdiction waste from lo-
cal private facilities (i.e., import restrictions) is not an essen-
tial management 'tool. It is instead discrimination,
particularly when it allows hoarding of private disposal
capacity.296
C. The Market Participant Doctrine is Unsuitable and
Makes Government Subservient to an Inappropriate
Constitutional Doctrine
Faced with the threat of Commerce Clause litigation,
municipalities have grappled with finding a legally defensible
way of managing local waste. The uncertainty, some might
say utter confusion, in applying constitutional doctrine to
solid waste management causes municipalities to seek a
safety net. Some hope to have found it with the market par-
ticipant doctrine. Their reliance is misplaced.
The Philadelphia decision suggested that state-owned or
subsidized facilities may be able to avoid the type of Com-
merce Clause scrutiny applied to state regulation of private
waste facilities. 297 This option was also left open in Fort Gra-
tiot.298 In Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, decided the
same day as Fort Gratiot, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered the
296. This is not to say that in some cases it may not be permissible. For
example, if a local facility is processing local waste, the local jurisdiction may
justifiably impose restrictions on its processing of out-of-jurisdiction waste be-
cause of the problems inherent in segregating such a fungible item as municipal
garbage, especially if commingled.
297. The Supreme Court stated: "We express no opinion about New Jersey's
power, consistent with the Commerce Clause, to restrict to state residents ac-
cess to state-owned resources . . . or New Jersey's power to spend state funds
solely on behalf of state residents and businesses .... ." Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 627-28 n.6, 98 S. Ct. at 2537 n.6, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 484 n.6.
298. The Court stated: "Nor does the case raise any question concerning pol-
icies that municipalities or other governmental agencies may pursue in the
management of publicly owned facilities. The case involves only the validity of
the Waste Import Restrictions as they apply to privately owned and operated
landfills." Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 146.
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market participant doctrine as an option whereby Alabama
could open its own facility catering only to Alabama
customers. 2
99
Whether or not publicly owned or sponsored facilities are
subject to dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny is a multi-bil-
lion dollar issue.300 Because of the potential money involved,
municipalities, 30 1 as well as legal commentators, 30 2 have
grasped onto the market participant exception 303 to the Com-
299. Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at
2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 138 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
300. For example, municipally sponsored "waste to energy" incinerators re-
quire a large volume of municipal solid waste in order to operate. Were these
plants to lose their source of waste due to cheaper temporal landfilling options
elsewhere and a Commerce Clause interpretation requiring the lower cost op-
tion, this could cost bondholders an estimated ten billion dollars
($10,000,000,000). See Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis Leaves
Incinerators Competing for Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at A2. This does
not include the other costs incurred around the country for developing and im-
plementing solid waste management plans and other effort aimed at creating
local garbage solutions.
301. See, e.g., Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal
Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (rejecting the doctrine). See also
Brief of Amicus Curiae, City of Springfield, Missouri in Support of Respondent,
C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 124 L.
Ed. 2d 635 (1993) (No. 92-1402); Brief of Amicus Curiae, County of San Diego,
California in Support of Respondent, Carbone (No. 92-1402).
302. See, e.g., Martin E. Gold, Solid Waste Management and the Constitu-
tion's Commerce Clause, 25 URB. LAw. 21, 29-32 (1993); Bradford C. Mank,
Out-of-State Trash: Solid Waste and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 38 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 25 (1990); Anne Ziebarth, Environmental Law: Solid
Waste Transport and Disposal Across State Lines - The Commerce Clause ver-
sus the Garbage Crisis, 1990 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 365, 370-76 (1990); David
Pomper, Comment, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Com-
merce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural" Resources, and the Solid Waste Crisis,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 1309 (1989); James Hinshaw, Comment, The Dormant Com-
merce Clause after Garcia: An Application to Interstate Commerce of Sanitary
Landfill Space, 67 IND. L.J. 511 (1992). But see William L. Kovacs & Anthony
A. Anderson, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services -
Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector, 18 ENVTL. L. 779
(1988).
303. The Supreme Court has applied the market participant doctrine in sev-
eral cases. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L.
Ed. 2d 220 (1976); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 65 L. Ed.
2d 244 (1980) (local resident preference in state-produced cement); White v.
Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employees, 460 U.S. 204, 103 S. Ct. 1042, 75
L. Ed. 2d 1 (1983). But see South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 81 L. Ed. 2d 71 (1984) (a plurality rejected the doc-
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merce Clause as a lifeboat to save public projects from the
stormy seas of Commerce Clause litigation. Unfortunately,
this lifeboat is not big enough, and in several recent cases has
sunk30 4 or has not even been launched.30 5 The doctrine has
many critics.30 6
The market participant doctrine is of recent vintage and
has as its basic theory the right of state and local government
to participate in the marketplace on the same terms as pri-
vate enterprise.30 7 However, participating on the same terms
has been interpreted as excluding the governmental partici-
pant from acting simultaneously as a regulator. As stated by
one district court,
The critical question. . . is whether the challenged govern-
mental conduct is more analogous to business activities of
traders and manufacturers - in which case the state
should be allowed to pursue its own economic interest and
determine those with whom it will deal in the private mar-
ket or is more analogous to an effort to regulate activities
trine). Incidentally, as pointed out in Swin Resource Sys. Inc. v. Lycoming
County, 883 F.2d 245, 249 (3d Cir. 1989), the author of each of the first three
decisions cited above, which applied the doctrine, dissented in the subsequent
decision.
304. See, e.g., S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1572.
305. See, e.g., Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid
Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), affd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st
Cir. 1991); Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn.
1992), affd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).
306. See generally Richard H. Seamon, Note, The Market Participant Test in
Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis - Protecting Protectionism?, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 697 (1985); Jonathan D. Varat, State 'Citizenship' and Interstate Equality,
48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 503-08 (1981). See, e.g., Jonathan Meyers, Note, Con-
fronting the Garbage Crisis: Increased Federal Involvement as a Means of Ad-
dressing Municipal Solid Waste Disposal, 79 GEO. L.J. 567, 580 (1991); William
L. Kovacs, States as Market Participants in Solid Waste Disposal Services -
Fair Competition or the Destruction of the Private Sector, 18 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 779 (1988); Robert Meltz, State Discrimination Against Im-
ported Solid Waste: Constitutional Roadblocks, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,383 (Sept. 1990).
307. This doctrine was first enunciated in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L. Ed. 2d. 220 (1976), on the same day that
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465, 49 L. Ed. 2d
245 (1976), announced what one commentator called the "New Federalism."
See generally TRIBE, supra note 52, § 6-11, at 430.
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among such [private] parties in the private market in
which case the state's conduct must be subject to commerce
clause scrutiny.308
Unfortunately, because of the significant health and safety
issues surrounding solid waste management, it would practi-
cally be malfeasance for a local government not to be a regu-
lator in this field. Thus, the market participant doctrine
creates a dilemma: the local government must regulate for
its citizens health, safety and the environment; however, it
may for the same reasons also feel compelled to manage its
solid waste through public facilities. 30 9 Solid waste manage-
ment is a "hybrid area that involves a distinctive public need
in a highly regulated environment."310
Another problem with the doctrine is that it has been
held to apply only to the market in which the state is a par-
ticipant.31' Courts have opined that if the market is not nar-
rowly defined, the exception might swallow the rule.312 Thus,
if a municipality were to participate in the residential waste
collection market, it may not participate in the waste disposal
308. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1572.
309. Nevertheless, the doctrine has been applied on occasion to uphold cer-
tain governmental waste management programs. See, e.g., Swin Resource Sys.,
Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989) (preference for local resi-
dents for County owned and operated landfill); Evergreen Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127 (D. Or. 1986), affd, 820 F.2d 1482
(9th Cir. 1987) (ordinance restricted district landfill to residents); Shayne Bros.
v. District of Columbia, 592 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1984) (restriction that only
locally collected waste be deposited in city operated disposal facility).
310. Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 259 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1987)).
311. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 97, 104 S.
Ct. 2237, 2245, 81 L. Ed. 2d 71, 83 (1984).
The limit of the market-participant doctrine must be that it allows
a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market in which
it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. The State may not
impose conditions, whether by statute, regulation, or contract, that
have a substantial regulatory effect outside of that particular
market.
Id.
312. See, e.g., S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1574; Swin Resource Sys., 883
F.2d at 259 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting); South-Central Timber Dev., 467 U.S. at
97-98, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 83.
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services market 313 even if the disposal were run by an allied
waste authority.314
For example, while a state is undoubtedly permitted to
own and operate a cement plant as a market participant, it is
very questionable whether it could also regulate the raw
materials for cement in a manner which would favor the
plant.315 Analogously, a municipality might install a materi-
als recycling composting facility. Does it also have the right
to regulate the raw materials used at such a facility - the
recyclables and the compost - in such a way as to favor the
municipal facility? This is perhaps an open question, but it
could be viewed as impermissible regulation outside the rele-
vant market.31 6 A court might reasonably hold that the
materials recycling and composting plants process the mate-
rial, but are not participants in the collection market, and
therefore, the state is not entitled to the market participant
exemption in directing raw materials to facilities. 31 7
The market participant doctrine is especially problem-
atic in the solid waste field. As discussed above, solid waste
presents basic health and safety concerns and demands gov-
ernmental regulation and supervision. Environmental con-
cerns have made this regulation increasingly complex.
Hazardous substance and toxic tort law also create financial
liabilities. Ominously, under the doctrine as interpreted by
at least one court,318 once the waste is placed into private
313. See Swin Resource Sys., 883 F.2d at 259 (Gibbons, C.J., dissenting).
314. See, e.g., S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1574.
315. See Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L. Ed. 2d 220
(1980).
316. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., 476 U.S. 82, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 81 L.
Ed. 2d 71.
317. Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992),
affd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993) (where the composting facility at issue was
public, but no market participant theory was forwarded). Two reasons perhaps
explain why no market participant theory was offered: 1) the flow control ordi-
nance was clearly regulatory and 2) the collection market was arguably distinct
from the composting (disposal) market.
318. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1576.
Even if [the municipality] could validly claim title to all waste pro-
duced within its borders, its proprietary interest would terminate
once it [sold] the waste to private haulers for collection .... [Any
attempt to attach conditions to the disposal of waste once it came to
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hands, the municipality has no power to prevent, by contract
or otherwise, its waste from ending up at a Superfund site
with all the possible attendant liabilities as a "potentially re-
sponsible party."3 19
Therefore, as far as waste management is concerned, the
market participant doctrine is fraught with peril. There is a
better alternative, and one which could have been applied in
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,320 the case which promul-
gated the doctrine. In that case the state paid a bounty for
junk automobiles in order to manage the discarded waste. In
effect, it avoided the need for state or municipal collection by
utilizing private collection and delivery to the State under the
incentive of a bounty. In essence, all that was involved was a
novel method of governmental solid waste management and,
for all the reasons put forth in this article, the dormant Com-
merce Clause need not have been implicated.
The approach is straightforward: distinguish municipal
waste management of locally generated waste (e.g., coffee
grinds, junk cars) from the commercial waste disposal trade.
This avoids the necessity of making government subservient
to a doctrine which, when applied to waste management, is of
only limited utility.
VII. Confusing Municipal Waste Management With
the Commercial Waste Trade
A. Decisions in Solid Waste Cases Often Unnecessarily
Implicate the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Philadelphia decision properly applied the dormant
Commerce Clause to a protectionist state law which directly
interfered with waste being moved through interstate chan-
nels of commerce. Unfortunately, neither Philadelphia nor
rest in private hands would be an impermissible "downstream re-
striction" outside of the market in which it participates.
Id.
319. See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (mu-
nicipal solid waste may be a "hazardous substance" under CERCLA); JEFFREY
M. GABA & DONALD W. STEVER, LAW OF SOLID WASTE, POLLUTION PREVENTION
AND RECYCLING, supra note 29, § 4.05.
320. 426 U.S. 794, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 49 L. Ed. 2d 220 (1976).
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its progeny distinguishes material which is in commerce from
material which, as suggested above, should not be considered
as an article of trade. Making such a distinction is the only
principled way to reconcile widely divergent cases which, if
waste is viewed as an article of commerce, are irreconcilable
using Commerce Clause doctrine.3 21 There follows a discus-
sion recent cases exemplifying the complexities of applying
the dormant Commerce Clause to solid waste
management.322
Courts have had little difficulty ruling on regulations
that operate as import restrictions. In BFI Medical Waste
Systems v. Whatcom County,323 a citizens group sponsored an
initiative which resulted in a county ordinance banning all
out-of-county infectious medical waste from the jurisdiction.
The district court found that the ordinance deprived a private
incinerator located within the county of a significant amount
of out-of-county and Canadian medical waste. Because the
ordinance prohibited importing solely on the basis of origin,
the court held it to be impermissible discrimination against
interstate and foreign commerce in violation of the Commerce
Clause.324
Similarly, in Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 25
the county passed a resolution requiring a permit for the
transportation of out-of-county waste into the county. This
affected a landfill which a local city and private company
sought to turn into a regional landfill, against the desires of
the county commissioners. 326 The Eleventh Circuit did not
321. The wide divergence between the federal circuits on the issue of (export)
flow control is apparently the reason the Court granted certiorari in the Car-
bone case. The pertinent Commerce Clause issue is not whether an export ban
is simply the mirror of an import restriction because it hinders the movement of
an article of commerce, but whether locally generated and locally managed
waste is an article of commerce.
322. BFI Medical Waste Sys. v. Whatcom County, 756 F. Supp. 480 (W.D.
Wash. 1991); Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir.
1991); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267
(7th Cir. 1992).
323. 756 F. Supp. 480 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
324. Id. at 484.
325. 939 F.2d 941 (11th Cir. 1991).
326. Id. at 943.
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view the resolution as an act of economic protectionism, be-
cause it treated out-of-county waste and out-of-state waste
the same.3 27 Nevertheless, the court applied the Pike balanc-
ing test, and found that the prospective effect of the ordi-
nance on interstate commerce was more than incidental,
particularly if similar ordinances were passed by other coun-
ties.328 The Eleventh Circuit held that the ordinance violated
the Commerce Clause. The court, however noted that other
courts had reached the opposite conclusion in comparable
settings.329
In Government Suppliers Consolidating Services, Inc. v.
Bayh,330 brokers of municipal solid waste successfully chal-
lenged, under the Commerce Clause, an Indiana statute
which banned the backhauling of waste. The waste industry
was clearly moving waste which other localities found the
need to export, and the Indiana restrictions unnecessarily
burdened this movement.331  The court noticed the
"'[c]ircumstances of [the statute's] enactment suggest that it
was the [legislature's] principal objective' of the statutes to
impede importation of trash."332 Therefore, the Seventh Cir-
cuit applied strict scrutiny in finding the Indiana provisions
unconstitutional. 333 Indiana's backhaul ban clearly had
nothing to do with state or local solid waste management.
Rather, it was an attempt to isolate Indiana from a national
garbage problem.
Distinguishable from protectionist discrimination
against the garbage trade are cases involving bona fide at-
tempts to locally manage locally generated waste. For exam-
ple, in Evergreen Waste Systems, Inc. v. Metropolitan Service
District,334 a three county district which operated a landfill
owned by the City of Portland, banned out-of-county disposal
327. Id. at 944.
328. Id. at 944-45.
329. Id. at 945.
330. 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992).
331. Id. at 1285.
332. Id. at 1278-79 (citing Lewis v. B.T. Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 100
S. Ct. 2009, 64 L. Ed. 2d 702 (1980)).
333. Government Suppliers, 975 F.2d at 1279.
334. 643 F. Supp. 127, 129 (D. Or. 1986), affd, 820 F.2d 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
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in order to extend the life of the landfill. A private hauler
challenged the ban as a violation of the dormant Commerce
Clause. The district court applied the Pike balancing test and
found that the ban regulated evenhandedly because it ap-
plied to only one landfill, and it also barred waste from most
Oregon counties as well as out-of-state. The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed on basically the same rationale.
The legal reasoning used appears quite ad hoc. However,
this lack of a unifying legal framework is eliminated if Ever-
green and similar cases are seen for what they are - local
government using municipal resources to manage local
waste. The citizens of metropolitan Portland owned the land-
fill and paid for the tri-county waste district. This is no dif-
ferent from establishing a first rate school district,335 and the
benefits of both can remain local. The local citizenry need not
open their school district, 336 nor their waste management dis-
trict,337 to outsiders. 338 This is not protectionist, rather it is
prudence.
It is also prudent not to export a local problem. For ex-
ample, New Jersey's policy against exporting waste has also
withstood Commerce Clause challenge in state courts.339 In
335. Cf. Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir.
1989). "We know of no case, however, that holds that municipalities must per-
mit out-of-state students to matriculate in its public schools on equal terms
with in-state students in order to comply with the commerce clause." Id. at 251
n.2.
336. Cf. Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 328, 103 S. Ct. 1838, 1842, 75 L.
Ed. 2d 879, 887 (1983) (upholding state residence requirements because it "fur-
thers substantial state interest in assuring that services provided for its resi-
dents are enjoyed only by residents").
337. Because of the public ownership, it might be tempting to assert the
"market participant" exception to the Commerce Clause. However, the regula-
tory activities of the Portland "Metro" district might be viewed as voiding the
exception. See, e.g., Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Dispo-
sal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1575 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
338. For purposes of the Constitution, it should not matter whether munici-
pal disposal is actually within the jurisdiction, or at designation facilities else-
where. A municipality should be allowed to choose an economical, long-term
and environmentally sound disposal facility in another jurisdiction if this is
best for its citizens.
339. In re Long-Term Out-Of-State Waste Disposal Agreement, 568 A.2d 547
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), cert. denied, 583 A.2d 337 (N.J. 1990); cf. Bor-
ough of Glassboro v. Gloucester County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 495 A.2d 49,
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J. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of En-
vironmental Protection,3 40 the Third Circuit rationalized the
state-mandated use of a local transfer station in part because
the waste brought to the transfer station ultimately flowed to
the very same out-of-state landfill used by petitioner
Filiberto.3 41 Therefore, as to the flow control law at issue,
Filiberto could establish "no demonstrable effect whatsoever
on the interstate flow of goods." 342
Presumably, the Third Circuit would have had more dif-
ficulty justifying the ordinance had the waste been directed
to a new sanitary landfill or incinerator for local eradication,
since this would clearly deprive outsiders of the commodity.
For example, the garbage industry would certainly argue
that flow control to a municipal waste-to-energy facility,
would "confer[ ] an advantage upon in-state economic inter-
ests," which the Filiberto court viewed as the essential ques-
tion.343 Because the court found no discrimination against
interstate commerce, it viewed as unnecessary the need to
conduct a Pike balancing test.344
55 (N.J. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1008, 106 S. Ct. 532, 88 L. Ed. 2d 464
(1985) (upholding injunction barring import of waste into private landfill).
"[The injunction's] purpose is to permit emergency access to [the landfill] for the
protection of the health, safety, and welfare of a limited number of municipali-
ties in the tri-county area that have no alternative means of disposing of solid
waste." Id. Presuming that the urgency of the Borough of Glassboro situation
was such that it outweighed Commerce Clause considerations, there would nev-
ertheless appear to be a "takings" issue which was not discussed. See, e.g., Nol-
lan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 97 L. Ed. 2d
677 (1987) (temporary taking compensable); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1978) (character of
governmental action, economic impact, and interference with investment
backed expectations of particular significance).
340. 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988).
341. Id. at 921-22.
342. Id. at 922 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117,
126-27 n.16, 98 S. Ct. 2207, 2214 n.16, 57 L. Ed. 2d 91, 100 n.16 (1978). The
Exxon court upheld a statute prohibiting producers or refiners from operating
gas stations, reasoning that the Commerce Clause protects the interstate mar-
ket, not particular interstate firms. Id.
343. Filiberto, 857 F.2d at 919.
344. Id. at 922. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit was unmistakenly im-
pressed by the "numerous legitimate [and beneficial] purposes" of the rule. See
id. at 920.
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The Third Circuit has subsequently reviewed the situa-
tion where solid waste was completely eliminated locally, in a
regional landfill, though the challenge was by a waste hauler
seeking to use the landfill, not bring the waste elsewhere. In
Swin Resource Systems, Inc. v. Lycoming County,345 the
Third Circuit held that Lycoming County, acting as a market
participant as to its landfill, could impose prohibitively ex-
pensive delivery fees upon haulers coming from outside the
five and a half county local service area. The court rejected
the contention that the market participant doctrine was un-
availing because the landfill was a natural resource. 346 In-
stead it applied the doctrine, 347 noting that in this case "a
state subdivision has used initiative to build a waste disposal
facility to serve its needs."348
The Swin court did not directly discuss how the munici-
pally-sponsored landfill might be viewed as depriving out-of-
state interests of solid waste. The court observed that the
County took measures to insure that local waste was deliv-
ered to the landfill. 349 The court did not discuss whether its
conception of the market participant doctrine encompassed
either such flow control measures or New Jersey's compre-
hensive regulatory approach to solid waste management.350
It might be recalled that New Jersey uses a solid waste utility
approach with twenty-two different utilities responsible for
formulating and implementing solid waste management
plans.351 This New Jersey approach seems more regulatory
than participatory for purposes of market participant
discussion.
The Swin court also rejected the dissent's argument that
the market participant doctrine was overruled under Garcia
and therefore not properly used as a basis for decision.352
345. 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989).
346. Id. at 254.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 248.
350. The difficulties in applying the market participant doctrine to solid
waste management is discussed in the Swin Resources dissent. Id. at 257-62.
351. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:E (West 1991).
352. Swin Resources, 883 F.2d at 255.
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The dialog between the majority and the dissent in Swin
demonstrates the difficulty in applying Commerce Clause
doctrine to what should be considered a local police power
function involving a noisome environmental pollutant.
Straining the limits of Commerce Clause analysis is
Medical Waste Associates, Ltd. v. Mayor of Baltimore,353
where the court invents a new doctrine to avoid applying the
Commerce Clause to local solid waste management. The City
of Baltimore wanted a medical waste incinerator for the resi-
dents of the city. Medical Waste Associates Limited (MWAL)
initiated a plan to build an incinerator and was granted ap-
provals, including a conditional use zoning approval which
limited (MWAL) to receipt of local medical waste. (MWAL)
undertook construction of the facility. However, after more
than two and one-half years into the process, just as opera-
tions were to begin, (MWAL) objected that it wished to bring
in out-of-city medical waste, thereby raising the sword of the
dormant Commerce Clause.
The argument was that the city itself could have built
and operated this facility under the market participant ex-
ception to the Commerce Clause and that therefore, it would
be in error to invoke the per se rule applied in Philadelphia.
The Fourth Circuit found no Commerce Clause violation
since the ordinance did not violate the per se rule in Philadel-
phia where it banned waste from only one facility within the
city. Instead, the court adopted a "single facility exception" to
the per se rule, noting that this allows private capital to solve
a regional waste problem and also "reconcile[s] the 'market
participant' rule with the practical way that cities and coun-
ties solve regional waste problems."35 4 Consequently, the
city's action was upheld.355
353. 966 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1992).
354. Id. at 151. The Fourth Circuit did not discuss the utility option used in
New Jersey.
355. Evergreen Waste Sys. v. Metropolitan Serv. Dist., 643 F. Supp. 127, 151
(D. Or. 1986). The Fourth Circuit also noted what it viewed as the similarity of
Medical Waste Associates because the municipal entity there operated only a
single landfill. Id.
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Medical Waste Associates strains to invent a rationale for
avoiding the Commerce Clause, and there is certainly some
irony in its likening a commercial enterprise to a governmen-
tal market participant. Nevertheless, even if Baltimore itself
operated the incinerator, the court fails to discuss the perils
of the market participant doctrine discussed earlier in this
article.356
The rationales set forth in this article could have been
applied much more easily than those used by the Fourth Cir-
cuit. Local medical waste, incinerated at the city-designated
incinerator is not an article of interstate commerce, and the
citizens of Baltimore have the democratic right to manage
their own medical and infectious waste - the right to waste
self-governance. Medical Waste Associates is a case where
confused and unprincipled Commerce Clause jurisprudence
actually invited the litigation, and may have prevailed but for
the court's willingness to formulate a new rule.357
There will always be analytical difficulty if dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine is applied to local waste manage-
ment. If garbage is commerce, municipal government will
either attempt to exempt itself by squeezing into the market
participant exception, or be required to justify the purported
infringement on the garbage trade, either under the Pike bal-
ancing test or, if discrimination is present (as it arguably al-
ways is concerning de jure or de facto local waste export
barriers), strict scrutiny.358
The above examples are typical and reveal that most of
the cases which apply a dormant Commerce Clause analysis,
but uphold the municipal waste management, involve pub-
356. For example, there is little doubt that Baltimore's Health Department
regulates medical waste, and there is no discussion whether a flow control ordi-
nance applies to flow the waste to the incinerator.
357. This new rule was the single facility exception of the market participant
exception of the judicial (dormant) exception that the Commerce Clause's exclu-
sive grant of power to Congress to regulate commerce.
358. A law which discriminates against out-of-state commerce is subject to
strict scrutiny. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 447 U.S. 131, 106 S. Ct. 2440, 91 L.
Ed. 2d 110 (1986). If "protectionism" is present, the offensive law is virtually
per se invalid under Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed.
2d at 475.
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licly managed facilities. Some of these cases noted above,
rely on the market participant doctrine to extricate the mu-
nicipality from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. How-
ever, the market participant exception is an unsatisfactory
safety valve because the exception vanishes when govern-
ment regulates or when different markets are involved.
B. The DeVito Trilogy: Local Solid Waste Management
Injudiciously Held as Violating the Commerce Clause
Unfortunately, a recent and pernicious line of cases has
developed. Beginning with Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking,
Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp.,359 sev-
eral cases have invalidated state and local attempts to man-
age locally generated waste, by interpreting the dormant
Commerce Clause to preclude any interference with the flow
of garbage to out-of-state locations.
Until recently, the courts had not gone so far as to invali-
date local management of locally generated waste. Such
waste management was viewed as an essential local func-
tion.360 This situation changed dramatically after the First
Circuit invalidated Rhode Island's statewide system for man-
aging its waste.
1. The DeVito Case
In Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island
Solid Waste Management Corp.,361 the state's waste manage-
ment corporation (RISWMC) directed the flow of all commer-
cially-generated solid waste to the RISWMC landfill.362
Commercial generators were charged a higher tipping fee
than DeVito charged for hauling the waste and arranging for
out-of-state disposal.363 The court found this objectionable.
359. 770 F. Supp. 775 (D.R.I.), affd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991).
360. Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1194 (6th Cir.
1981) (traditional management roles).
361. DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 775.
362. Id. at 777.
363. Id. at 779 (noting that the "tipping fee" charged by the facilities to
which DeVito transported waste was considerably less than the $49 per ton
charged by RISWMC).
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Businesses, the court said, "have a strong interest in having
the freedom to dispose of waste at rates set by an unfettered
interstate market rather than an artificially created monop-
oly."3 64 The district court then applied a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis predicated upon its view that the Rhode Is-
land export ban was "essentially a protectionist measure
[whose] immediate purpose and effect are to increase
RISWMC's revenues by preventing commercially generated
waste from being transported out of Rhode Island ... "365
The court only indirectly discussed whether Rhode Is-
land could accomplish the same ends by forming a state-wide
district and then assessing a user fee or special assessment
equivalent to the $49 per ton tipping fee, in order to finance
the state landfill. 366 The district court did note that
RISWMC failed to explain why revenue bond financing would
not be an alternative to an export ban. Nevertheless, the dis-
trict court viewed RISWMC's export ban as "an absolute ban
on interstate commerce."367 It appears that the district court
would view any governmental subsidy which induced in-state
364. Id. at 779.
365. Id. at 781.
366. Besides district assessments, another option would be to use general
state tax revenues to finance state-run facilities or to guarantee the bonds for
such facility, as suggested by plaintiff DeVito regarding RISWMC plans to build
waste-to-energy facilities. Id. at 785. A zero tip fee for state residents would
virtually guarantee a flow of waste to such facility. However, as discussed else-
where in this article, the state's regulatory role in solid waste management may
void its assertion of a "market participant" exception to the Commerce Clause.
Id.
367. Id. at 785. Nevertheless, DeVito distinguishes J. Filiberto Sanitation v.
New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988). Filiberto
held that a state regulation requiring that waste be taken to a state operated
processing station first did not violate the Commerce Clause because the sta-
tion was not in competition with out of state landfills and therefore did not
excessively burden interstate commerce. On the other hand, in DeVito, the
state-operated facilities were in competition with out of state facilities and
therefore found to be excessively burdensome on interstate commerce. Cf. Gov-
ernment Suppliers Consolidating Servs. v. Bayh, 975 F.2d 1267 (7th Cir. 1992)
("backhaul" provisions were facially neutral, yet impermissibly burdened inter-
state commerce). As a policy matter, allowing flow control to transfer stations
but not municipal disposal facilities discourages local management of local
waste, which tends to create a greater need for waste exportation through a
transfer station.
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waste to flow to the state facility as violative of the Commerce
Clause because, vis a vis the garbage industry, RISWMC or
Rhode Island would set "an artificially high rate in order to
subsidize its other activities. RISWMC [or Rhode Island] is
entitled to make that choice but not to make interstate com-
merce bear the consequences." 368
In effect, DeVito thrusts a preemptive free market eco-
nomic theory upon local solid waste management based upon
the court's view that the Commerce Clause prohibits states
from infringing on the flow of waste out of the state. The peo-
ple's choice to manage their waste within the state is irrele-
vant. The DeVito rationale would, practically speaking,
never allow a state-created entity such as RISWMC to favor
itself over out-of-state competitors, even if it were to manage
exclusively in-state waste. In essence, DeVito denies the state
and its citizens any ability to manage solid waste other than
purely as a simple market competitor.369
Under the reasoning used, it would not likely make any
difference to the court were a state-wide referendum con-
ducted and each citizen voted for managing his or her waste
locally. By the logic used, out-of-state industry would still
have a "right" to the waste, and would therefore usurp a sov-
ereign state's democratic process.
2. Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid
Waste Disposal Authority370
In Southeast Alabama, the garbage industry brought a
challenge to municipal ordinances enacted by the cities of
Headland, Geneva, and Ozark, Alabama.37 1 The defendant
solid waste authority was created as part of comprehensive
solid waste management planning required by Alabama.
368. DeVito, 770 F. Supp. at 785.
369. The court referred to the RISWMC as a participant in the market for
which the state's flow control law confers a direct economic advantage. 770 F.
Supp. at 785. Regulations such as the flow control found in DeVito likely void
the market participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
370. 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala. 1993).
371. These cities were chosen as representative of 36 local governments, in-
cluding four counties, in the area, some of which contractually obligated them-
selves to adopt export flow control laws regarding local solid waste. Id. at 1569.
19931
85
242 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
Under the solid waste management plan, the authority would
build a disposal facility and three transfer stations, and the
participating municipalities would adopt flow control ordi-
nances directing all local waste to the authority's facilities. 372
The Headland ordinance provided for either city or private
collection and hauling. The Geneva ordinance was similar
except that it vested in the city title to all local waste and
prohibited private collectors from contracting directly with
waste generators. The Ozark flow control ordinance was sim-
ilar to Headland's except that it permitted collectors and
haulers to export waste out of the state subject to certain re-
porting preconditions. Obviously, the intent was that at least
one of these variations would survive judicial scrutiny, and
therefore allow the community control over its waste.
Not surprisingly, the plaintiffs pointed out that each of
the above ordinances required, either on its face or in effect,
that all solid waste be delivered to the authority's facility,
and thus prevented the waste from being disposed of out-of-
state. They argued that this interfered with interstate com-
merce. The district court agreed. It quoted Fort Gratiot's
holding that the dormant Commerce Clause "prohibits States
from 'advanc[ing] their own commercial interests by cur-
tailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or
out of the state.'"373 The court further cited Fort Gratiot for
the proposition that states are generally prohibited from tak-
ing actions that interfere with the free flow of trade among
the states "unless the [interference] is demonstrably justified
by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism."374
The solid waste authority and the three cities sought to
apply the market participant exception to the Commerce
Clause in their defense. The court rejected this almost out-of-
hand, stating that the intermunicipal user contracts which
required the flow control ordinances "expressly reflect that
372. Id. at 1569-70.
373. Id. at 1571 (quoting Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023, 119
L. Ed. 2d at 147) (emphasis added).
374. Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2023-24, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 147
(quoting New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 108 S. Ct. 1803,
100 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1988)).
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the intended effect of the ordinances is to assure the Author-
ity's economic success by keeping locally generated solid
waste out of interstate commerce and within the local area,
and thus provide a steady and adequate supply for the
Authority."37 5
As the court saw it, "the three cities entered the solid
waste markets not to compete for their own individual profit
... but rather.., to assure the economic success of the Au-
thority... " and in any case their ordinances "impermissibly
regulate[d] outside the markets in which [they were] actual
participants."376 To more broadly define the market would
allow the market participant exception to swallow the rule.377
It was also obvious to the court that the ordinances were
designed not only to set up a system of service in the various
waste markets, but also to regulate these markets. Thus the
primary purpose was not to participate in the waste markets,
such as by operating a municipally-owned cement plant,378
but rather to control and regulate these markets and exclude
others. 379
The district court went on to find that the vesting title
provision of the City of Geneva's ordinance was a mere pre-
text, for the reason that "solid waste is generally by definition
abandoned or discarded material" that is "universally re-
garded as a potential public nuisance" and that waste haulers
charge a fee "to carry away something their customers most
375. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1573.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 1574. The court noted that the cities may have been involved
with the residential and commercial/industrial waste collection markets, but it
was the authority, not the cities, which was involved with the waste disposal
services market. Therefore, the cities' ordinances "reach[ed] outside the mar-
kets in which the cities participate." Id.; see also White v. Massachusetts Coun-
cil of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 103 S. Ct. 1042, 75 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1983);
Swin Resource Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming, 883 F.2d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 1989) (Gib-
bons, C.J., dissenting).
378. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1574 (citing Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447
U.S. 429, 444, 100 S. Ct. 2271, 2281, 65 L. Ed. 2d 244, 255 (1980)). The Reeves
Court held that the fact that a state operated plant is a market participant does
not preclude others from setting up cement plants within the same borders.
447 U.S. at 429, 100 S. Ct. at 2271, 65 L. Ed. 2d at 244.
379. Id. at 1575.
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heartily do not want."380 So why would a solid waste author-
ity seek title to local solid waste? The court saw no bona fide
reason. Instead, it viewed the notion of vested title as "a fak-
ery and a pretext for requiring that all private waste collec-
tors deliver waste to the Authority."381
In its final analysis, the S.E. Alabama court resorted to
standard dormant Commerce Clause analysis pertaining to
customary articles of commerce. It noted that where "'legis-
lative objectives are credibly advanced and there is no patent
discrimination against interstate trade,'" then the Pike bal-
ancing test can be applied. 38 2 But where, as here, the ordi-
nances "'overtly block[ I the flow of interstate commerce,"' it
cannot be said that the "'effects upon interstate commerce
are only incidental."' 38 3 To the court, the flow control ordi-
nances were pure economic protectionism to provide income
to the authority. Comprehensive long-term solid waste man-
agement planning was a legitimate local purpose, but "legiti-
mate and necessary goal[s] cannot be achieved by illegitimate
and unnecessary means.38 4
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1576. See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326-27, 99 S.
Ct. 1727, 1731, 60 L. Ed. 2d 250, 255 (1978). Although the Hughes court re-
fused to exempt state wildlife from potential Commerce Clause application, it
did note that
While the Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the states, it does not say what the states may or
may not do in the absence of congressional action, nor how to draw
the line between what is and what is not commerce among the
states. Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written
word, this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this
Nation by the meaning it has given to these great silences of the
Constitution.
441 U.S. at 326 n.2, 99 S. Ct. at 1731 n.2, 60 L. Ed. 2d at 255 n.2 (quoting H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534-535, 69 S. Ct. 657, 663, 93 L.
Ed. 865, 847 (1949)).
382. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1581 n.18 (quoting Chemical Waste
Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. -, - n.5, 112 S. Ct. 2009, 2014 n.5, 119 L.
Ed. 2d 121, - (1992)) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
383. Id (citations omitted).
384. Id. at 1581 (citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 98 S. Ct. at 2536-
37, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 483).
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The court saw a number of options to a total ban on inter-
state commerce. 38 5 Among these were local bank financing,
county warrants secured by their full faith and credit, munic-
ipal construction with competitive rates with municipal sub-
sidization, private financing, ad valorem taxes or utility bill
assessments. 38 6 After suggesting these alternatives, the
court questioned whether such a facility was even needed for
the health and safety of the communities.
The court's alternative discussion is necessarily superfi-
cial because of the unprincipled rationale relied on - that
locally managed garbage is interstate commerce. The options
not presented (municipal collection, formation of a utility,
franchising, economic flow control) would direct waste to des-
ignated facilities just as thoroughly as a flow control ordi-
nance. The options which the court did present urged
competitive rates with municipal subsidization. 38 7
Apparently, it is the court's view that local citizens must
pay a premium for erecting facilities to process their own
waste. They must not only pay for the facility, but must also
make up the difference between the costs of the municipal
facility and the prevailing market rates charged by the trash
trade. Thus, the more citizens are willing to pay for environ-
mentally sound disposal facilities, the greater the premium
they must pay for depriving industry of its purported right to
garbage. 388
385. Id. at 1581-82.
386. Id. at 1581.
387. Presumably if the municipal rates were so "competitive" as to deprive
outside industry of waste, a Commerce Clause lawsuit would follow urging that
municipal subsidization was depriving them of their right to solid waste.
388. If a municipal recycling facilitity costs $20 million to build, resulting in
a net cost of $100 per ton, and industry can dispose of the waste for $20 at an
unlined landfill (or at a disposal site at some foreign waste haven), then the
logic of S.E. Alabama appears to be that the municipality is not permitted to
charge more than $20 per ton. Note that if it charges less than $20 per ton, the
municipal facility will receive all recyclables through economic flow control, and
that this consequently deprives the garbage industry of recyclables due to the
municipal subsidization. If, on the other hand, the municipality charges more
than $20 per ton, it is overpriced and therefore should expect to receive no
waste (it becomes a "white elephant"). Finally, if it charges exactly $20 per ton,
there is no certainty that this market price will not fluctuate, resulting in a
non-competitive price and a possible Commerce Clause lawsuit.
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The court concluded by repeating that the flow control
ordinances could not be used to finance the authority by iso-
lating, and thus insulating, the "four-county region from the
rough and tumble of interstate commerce and the economic
competition that comes with it."389 The court refused to ad-
dress "the difficult hypothetical question" of whether a city
could nationalize the solid waste services by completely un-
dertaking collection and disposal of solid waste within its
boundaries. 390
Unfortunately for its analysis, this last issue is the one
which the S.E. Alabama court should have addressed first. If
the four counties could permissibly initiate joint municipal
collection and disposal, it is difficult to see a meaningful dif-
ference using flow control, since the waste flows to the same
facilities. If the authority and local cities could not undertake
joint collection and disposal permissibly under the Commerce
Clause, then the result would be to emasculate local solid
waste management, and municipal waste self-rule.
3. Waste System Corp. v. County of Martin391
Perhaps the most egregious case prohibiting municipal
management of local waste is County of Martin, where an
Iowa landfill operator successfully challenged two flow con-
trol ordinances directing solid waste to an eight million dollar
composting facility (the Prairieland facility) built by two
counties. 392 The counties' designation ordinances directed all
wastes to the Prairieland facility, which the district court
389. S.E. Alabama, 814 F. Supp. at 1583.
390. Id. at 1583 n.22.
391. 784 F. Supp. 641 (D. Minn. 1992), affd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).
392. Id. Presumably this investment was deemed to be for the public wel-
fare, and it is unlikely that local taxpayers considered that such an investment
to compost local waste would be viewed by the judiciary as protectionist or dis-
criminatory. After the County of Martin decision, certain local officeholders be-
came unelected, perhaps in part due to their failure to foresee the fiasco of a
federal judge finding that local management of local compostable material a
burden on interstate commerce. The local Congressman, David Minge, has in-
dicated that he will propose a congressional fix as a result of the court decision.
See Jim Samuelson, Minge Bill Will Let Communities Control Garbage, FAIR-
MONT & SENTINEL, May 2, 1993, at 11; Legislation Would Allow Flow Control,
FAIRMONT & SENTINEL, July 14, 1993, at 1.
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also found was at the direct expense of the landfill which was
receiving approximately 40% (10,400 tons) of the counties'
solid waste.393 The district court found, and the circuit court
agreed, that the designation ordinances unconstitutionally
interfered with the flow of waste into commerce because the
counties' waste "otherwise available in interstate commerce
is barred from transport across the state line."394 The circuit
court also agreed that the designation ordinances were en-
acted "as a protectionist measure to ensure the [financial] vi-
ability of the counties' own waste facility."395 The circuit
court saw no difference between the import restrictions inval-
idated in Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot, and the designation
ordinances' export ban.396
Under the Eighth Circuit's economic view of the Com-
merce Clause, it would be impermissible for the citizens of
Martin County to vote to build advanced state-of-the-art re-
cycling and composting facilities to fully manage and elimi-
nate virtually all local solid waste. First, the flow of waste to
interstate commerce would cease (via total local management
and elimination of the waste). Second, if today the garbage
could be disposed of by an unscrupulous out-of-state firm for
$20 per ton (perhaps in a different country), the court would
require that the municipal recycling and composting facilities
charge no more than $20 per ton and require the local taxpay-
ers make up the difference.397 Nevertheless the district court
failed to explain how a taxpayer subsidy alternative would be
393. 784 F. Supp. at 645.
394. 985 F.2d at 1387 (citing Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S. Ct. at 2535,
57 L. Ed. 2d at 481) (the ordinance "overtly block[s] the flow of interstate com-
merce at [the Counties'] borders").
395. Id. at 1388, affg 784 F. Supp. at 644.
396. As the Eighth Circuit explained, "[tihe case before us now involves ordi-
nances which prevent export of in-state waste to out-of-state facilities. This
difference, however, is of no consequence. Regulations which restrict transport-
ing waste out of a state also are subject to the limitations of the Commerce
Clause." 985 F.2d at 1386.
397. When discussing the designation ordinance, the district court said, "As
an alternative, the Counties could offer competitive tipping fees to ensure that
the necessary waste stream is available. The difference between the market
tipping fee and the cost to run the Facility could be borne by the Counties." 784
F. Supp. at 645.
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permissible in light of the court's view that "financing
[a] 'good idea' on the back of interstate commerce is
improper." 398
The Eighth Circuit declined to offer an alternative. 399
This is because there simply are no viable alternatives under
the constitutional interpretation being applied. If solid waste
is ab initio an article of commerce, then a state and its polit-
ical subdivisions have no business attempting to destroy it,
such as by incineration, landfilling or composting. If the
guaranty of a republican form of government and basic prin-
ciples of federalism do not apply to citizens' efforts to rule
their own waste, then local government will have no business
recycling what can be more cheaply dumped into commerce.
It is unknown whether either the district or circuit court
considered alternatives such as municipal collection, creation
of a utility, or economic flow control through a district or au-
thority even though these alternatives deprive the garbage
industry of exactly the same waste. For example, if a munici-
pality were to use taxpayer dollars to put up the composting
facility such as the one found in County of Martin, and then
charge no fee for disposal at the facility, the net result would
be that taxpayers would bring their waste to the municipal
facility at the expense of interstate firms.400 There is the
same result if the counties collect and deliver the waste mu-
nicipally, or award a franchise.
398. Id.
399. Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Ala. Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814
F. Supp. 1566, 1583 n.22 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (declining to answer the "difficult
hypothetical question" posed by the defendants, namely "whether it would vio-
late the commerce clause if a single municipality completely occupied the collec-
tion and disposal of solid waste within its boundaries - that is, the city
collected and disposed of all solid waste at its own landfill, and prohibited any
participation by private parties"). In this regard, the Eighth Circuit was unlike
the courts in DeVito and S.E. Alabama, which at least attempted to suggest
options. The Eighth Circuit commented, "We sympathize with the Counties'
efforts to establish a system of waste management. However, we must decide
in accord with the principles of the dormant Commerce Clause." County of
Martin, 985 F.2d at 1389.
400. This so-called economic flow control may be permissible under the mar-
ket participant doctrine exception to the Commerce Clause. However, because
local government is intimately involved in the regulation of solid waste, this
exception could be held inapplicable. See generally supra part VI.C.
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The Eighth Circuit thus avoided the logical extension,
and "Achilles Heel," of its dormant Commerce Clause ration-
ale. For the purposes of the Commerce Clause, the district
and circuit courts in County of Martin equated garbage to an
economically beneficial commodity.40 1 Therefore, the courts
viewed governmental efforts to stifle trade in that commodity
as subject to constitutional scrutiny. The analysis is both in-
appropriate and anti-democratic.
It was judicial error (some might say arrogance) for the
district court in County of Martin to look at the $8 million
composting project for local solid waste and then declare,
without further explanation, that "financing that 'good idea'
on the back of interstate commerce is improper."40 2 It is dis-
graceful to our system of government that the federal courts
would tell the citizens of Martin and Faribault Counties after
they have financed a composting facility for local waste, that
they must now subsidize that facility because an outsider's
landfill has a constitutional entitlement to their waste. This
logic turns the Commerce Clause on its head.
The Commerce Clause theory promulgated in Devito, S.
E. Alabama and County of Martin is that the out-of-state gar-
bage industry has standing and the right to assert a constitu-
tional entitlement to garbage. Under this theory, a local
government's efforts to manage local solid waste (including
the financing and construction of facilities) interfere with
commerce because the interstate garbage marketplace is de-
prived of the waste. The interstate industry can join the com-
petitive procurement process to participate in constructing
and operating local waste facilities, and it has legal recourse
if it is excluded. 40 3 Thus, interstate industry has standing to
401. 985 F.2d at 1387; see discussion supra at VI.C. "If the object of [the
Counties] had been to obstruct the [export of all compostable solid waste], that
object will be accomplished if the statute before us be enforced." 985 F.2d at
1387 (quoting Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78, 83, 11 S. Ct. 213, 214, 34 L. Ed.
862, 864 (1891)). Brimmer is a Commerce Clause case voiding a state statute
which discriminated against out-of-state meat by requiring in-state inspection
of meat killed more than a hundred miles from the place of sale. Id.
402. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. at 645.
403. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 120-w (McKinney 1986) (competitive
proposals for solid waste facilities); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. art. 78 (McKinney
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offer competitive proposals for local solutions. However, it
should not have standing to block a local solution, only to
grab the garbage for a profit.
C. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown:40 4 An
Opportunity for the Supreme Court to Articulate a
Principled Constitutional Approach to Municipal
Solid Waste Management
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a
case with the potential to profoundly shape this nation's solid
waste management landscape. In Carbone, the petitioners'
brief states the question presented as follows: "Whether a lo-
cal law requiring disposal of all trash, regardless of origin, at
a designated local facility, and prohibiting the export of such
trash out of state, constitutes a burden on and a discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce in violation of the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution."40 5 The case
has been characterized as presenting to the Court the issue of
whether export flow control is the mirror image of the import
restrictions found unconstitutional by Philadelphia, Fort
Gratiot and Chemical Waste Management.406
Petitioners in Carbone407 claim to be brokers in trash
and recyclables. 408 They accept solid waste at what they
term a recycling center, and what the respondent Town char-
1981) (proceeding to challenge arbitrary or illegal action of official or public
body).
404. 182 A.D.2d 213, 587 N.Y.S.2d 681, appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d 760, 605
N.E.2d 874, 591 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1992), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411,
124 L. Ed. 2d 635 (1993) (the author wrote an amicus brief for the County of
Rockland, N.Y., in support of the respondent town in the case pending before
the United States Supreme Court). There is a related federal case granting
preliminary injunction on Commerce Clause grounds, but later mooted by the
subsequent state proceeding. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 770
F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
405. Brief for Petitioners at i, Carbone, - U.S. -, 113 S. Ct. 2411, 124 L. Ed.
2d 635 (1993) (No. 92-1402).
406. Court Decisions, Interstate Commerce: C & A Carbone Inc. v. Clarks-
town, 92-1402, NAT'L L.J., June 7, 1993, at 39.
407. C & A Carbone, Inc.; Recycling Products of Rockland, Inc.; C & C Re-
alty, Inc.; and, Angelo Carbone.
408. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4, Carbone, (No. 92-1402).
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acterizes as a transfer station. 40 9 The petitioners separate
and sort out at least some of the recyclable components from
the waste stream, and then send the sorted garbage and re-
cyclables to different out-of-state disposal destinations.
Because of the closure of its landfill, the Town passed a
flow control ordinance requiring that all acceptable waste
(generally, garbage excluding recyclables) 410 be brought to
the Town-sponsored transfer station.411 This town transfer
station charges $81 per ton, whereas the Carbone facility
charges $70 per ton. The Carbone petitioners claim that by
denying them the right to ship the solid waste, consisting of
garbage and recyclables, to out-of-state destinations, inter-
state commerce is burdened.4 12 The Town, on the other hand,
claims there is no such impermissible burden because its or-
dinance is evenhanded 413 and, like the transfer station in
Filiberto,414 ultimately ships the waste it receives to out-of-
state locations.
This is not a typical waste management case because it
involves both out-of-state and in-town waste.41 5 The petition-
ers attempt to use this to their advantage,41 6 by characteriz-
409. Id. at 5 n.3.
410. See Carbone, 182 A.D.2d at 217, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 682.
411. The Town-sponsored transfer station is operated by a private company
which has a "put or pay" contract with the Town which requires that the Town
deliver a certain quantity of waste, or pay for such waste not delivered. Under
New York law, such a contract should only be awarded after advertising for
competitive proposals or bids, which was done in this case. Joint Appendix at
26, Carbone (No. 92-1402). See generally N.Y. GEN. MuN. L. §§ 103, 120-w (Mc-
Kinney 1986).
412. 182 A.D.2d at 219, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 684.
413. Id. at 222, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 686.
414. 857 F.2d 913, 916 (3d Cir. 1988); see supra note 337 and accompanying
text.
415. Nor does it involve a broad interest in comprehensive local planning.
The town's interest is relatively temporal - how to manage town garbage due
to the landfill closure. The town is not involved in broader solid waste manage-
ment planning, which is the role of the county government. The county is the
solid waste planning unit. See, e.g., ROCKLAND COUNTY INTEGRATED SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN & GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
(N.Y. Sept. 1991).
416. One commentator cited the National Solid Waste Management Associa-
tion's (NSWMA) general counsel as stating that many state waste laws, though
not as restrictive as that found in Philadelphia, violate the Commerce Clause
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ing the whole case as involving what they label an export
ban. However, there are in reality two aspects of this case.
First concededly4 17 the focus of the local law, is the Town's
effort to manage its citizens' waste by efficient consolidation
of waste formerly disposed of at the closed town landfill. Sec-
ond is the aspect of the case which involves the purported im-
portation of out-of-state waste, and the direction of such
waste to the town-sponsored transfer station. This element
of Clarkstown's law is not at all common to flow control
ordinances.
The potentially catastrophic ruling in Carbone would be
if the Supreme Court accepted the simplistic notion that local
management of local waste, compelled by an export ban or
other equivalent means, is constitutionally identical to the
type of import ban found unconstitutional in Philadelphia
and its progeny. Clarkstown should be allowed to manage its
citizens' waste in any prudent manner, which it has done by
sponsoring a transfer station.418
This basic local management of local waste question has
another twist in the Carbone case. Rockland County plans to
use the taxing or assessment powers of a solid waste author-
ity or district to finance proposed new recycling facilities esti-
mated to cost between $60 and $85 million.419 This financing
mechanism will allow free or below-market tip fees, thus en-
suring a flow of County residents' recyclables to its recycling
facility by force of economics. Such economic flow control will
and, that given the staggering number of potential violations, the NSWMA has
to be "selective in deciding which laws to challenge." See Meyers, supra note
306.
417. In collateral proceedings in federal district court, Carbone did not con-
test the right of a municipality to manage its own waste. Carbone, 770 F. Supp.
at 854 n.2. However, this is not mentioned in the New York Court decision.
Carbone, 182 A.D.2d at 213, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 681.
418. Under the Town's agreement with the operator of its transfer station,
the station will eventually be turned over to the Town at a cost of one dollar.
This should insure directly the benefit of the Town's citizens. Justification for
requiring flow to a town-sponsored transfer station is fully described in J.
Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, 857 F.2d 913, 920-21 (3d Cir. 1988).
419. See ROCKLAND COUNTY INTEGRATED SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN &
GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (N.Y. Sept. 1991).
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have one additional consequence - it will deprive the Car-
bone facility of local recyclables even more completely than
through a flow control ordinance, since the public facility will
be less expensive.
The record in Carbone is poor regarding import restric-
tions,420 and arguably insufficient for Supreme Court re-
view.421 However, if the only out-of-state waste which the
Carbone enterprise receives is waste which should have been
managed locally in New Jersey, and thus illegally avoids New
Jersey's flow control at the expense of New Jersey's manage-
ment of its solid waste, then the issue comes full circle. It
again becomes a question whether state and local govern-
ments can manage their citizens' waste.
Unfortunately, the Town's ordinance is itself a major
source of confusion. For example, the Town ordinance could
be interpreted as mandating that all garbage transported on
Interstate 87 be delivered to the Town's transfer station,422
though there is no suggestion that the Town would ever at-
tempt this.
Aside from the smokescreens which petitioners and their
amici attempt to raise concerning their view of market eco-
nomics applied to the Constitution, Carbone essentially in-
volves one local government's attempt to manage local solid
waste under what may simply be an unartfully drafted
ordinance.
Therefore, it is imperative that the Supreme Court see
through the Commerce Clause rhetoric and get to the heart of
the jurisprudential issue, which is whether the Constitution
420. Many of the specific facts involved in Carbone are not at all clear. For
example, the record on appeal does not clearly establish the volume of out-of-
state waste entering the Carbone facility. The record does, however, indicate
that the New Jersey waste which may have been imported into the Town was
done so in violation of New Jersey's export bans. As discussed earlier, New
Jersey has a comprehensive program for managing its citizens' waste inter-
nally. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
421. For example, it is unclear to what extent New Jersey or other out-of-
state trash was involved in C & A Carbone's operations.
422. Section 3(A) of Town of Clarkstown Local Law No. 9 of 1990 reads, in
part, as follows: "The... transportation ... of acceptable waste within.., the
Town of Clarkstown shall be exclusively disposed of, controlled and regulated
by the Town. . . ." Brief for Respondent at 4, Carbone (No. 92-1402).
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prohibits local citizens from choosing how to manage their
own waste.423 If Carbone genuinely wished to be an inter-
state broker in waste, it could likely satisfy the Town and
perhaps the courts were it to be forthright about the origin of
the waste it allegedly imports for processing and brokering.
Otherwise, Carbone might merely wish to commingle local
and non-local garbage so that it can have the best of both ju-
risdictions by bootlegging waste which should be processed in
New Jersey to its lower-priced operation in Clarkstown, and
also bootlegging Clarkstown waste for shipment to lower
priced landfills, or roadside dumping. 424
If Carbone wished to operate a municipal waste facility,
it had three options. It could have offered a competitive pro-
posal and become a town-sponsored facility. It could have, as
part of the local political process, lobbied for the local flow
control ordinance to take the Carbone facility into considera-
tion, and perhaps allow it a joint franchise with the Town-
sponsored transfer station. Finally, it could have established
itself as a legitimate interstate vendor in waste processing
services and thus be entitled to operate just like any other
interstate business. 425 In the final analysis, Carbone should
not be allowed to usurp the local democratic process regard-
423. It is worthy to note that the federal district court, in a collateral pro-
ceeding, recognized that there is an essential difference between import restric-
tions and the local management of municipal waste through export flow control.
See Carbone, 770 F. Supp. at 854 n.2. Southern District of New York Chief
Judge Brieant stated:
This Court assumes, without deciding the issue, that the Town can
regulate the disposal of garbage generated within the Town's terri-
torial limits. In fact, plaintiffs do not dispute that Clarkstown may
regulate solid waste generated within its borders or that which the
Town contracts to dispose of for other municipalities.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hancock Indus. v. Schaeffer, 811 F.2d 225
(3d Cir. 1987) (upheld county authority's ban of out-of-county garbage from
landfill, where state imposed duty on county to dispose of own waste).
424. See Steve Lieberman, Abandoned Trash in West Virginia is Traced to
Local Carbone Site, RocKLAND J. NEws, July 26, 1992, at B3.
425. This is not to say that the Town may not be able to impose reasonable
restrictions consistent with the Pike balancing test as to imported waste which
is part of the interstate waste disposal trade. For example, the Town should be
allowed to treat all its manufacturers equally and, if part of local waste man-
agement, demand that commercial or industrial waste be brought to public fa-
cilities. This could apply to the residue of the purported recycling operation.
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ing a matter of such uniquely local concern - municipal solid
waste management. 426
VIII. Dangerous Consequences: It Is Poor Law, and
Bad Policy, to Include Local Waste
Management in Interstate Waste Trade
There is serious danger in granting locally managed gar-
bage status as a protected article of commerce under the
Commerce Clause. If garbage, in its rawest curbside form, is
considered a commodity of interstate commerce, illogical and
inequitable consequences must follow.
A. Progressive Facilities Should Not Need to Compete
Government should leave profit-making to private busi-
ness, but comprehensive local solid waste management is not
profitable. Waste, by its very nature and definition, is dis-
carded matter, yet this valueless matter must be moved,
processed and disposed of somewhere. Particularly if done in
an environmentally responsible way, this process is costly.
Waste disposal can be cheap, as with landfilling, or it can
be expensive, as with incineration. More progressive meth-
ods of waste disposal include materials recycling and com-
posting facilities. However, progressive methods of waste
management may become impracticable if they must compete
on an economic basis with older, less sound technologies. The
impact on the environment could be extreme. This may be
the outcome if the courts prohibit local government's subsidy
of waste facilities by determining this as "on the back of inter-
state commerce."427 Few, if any state-of-the-art and environ-
mentally sound waste facilities can compete with an unlined
landfill or dump on a dollar per ton basis, particularly if lo-
cated in a cash-hungry pollution haven.
426. In collateral proceedings in federal district court, petitioners did not
challenge a municipality's right to manage its own waste. 770 F. Supp. at 854
n.2.
427. Waste Sys. Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp. 641, 645 (D. Minn.
1992), affd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993).
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If local garbage is equated with interstate commerce, ap-
plicable Commerce Clause doctrine will require, at a mini-
mum, a Pike balancing test to insure that there is a
legitimate public purpose and that the public benefit out-
weighs the interference with commerce. 428 If the local man-
agement discriminates against outsiders through the use of
flow control or municipal collection, thus having more than
an incidental effect, 429 either strict scrutiny or a per se rule
will be applied. 430
If solid waste is protected interstate commerce, a Com-
merce Clause challenge might be made against a political de-
cision to build an environmentally sound and efficient local
composting or recycling plant. Since alternatives already ex-
ist, the proposed plant would be seen as interference with ex-
isting interstate commerce. 431 Some communities have
already been dissuaded from erecting facilities fearing possi-
ble Commerce Clause challenges that would deprive the facil-
ity of the flow of waste necessary for financing. 432
428. Id.
429. The balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137,
142, 90 S. Ct. 844, 847, 25 L. Ed. 2d 174, 178 (1970), and restated (but not
applied) in Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624, 98 S. Ct. at 2535, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 482,
is as follows:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits .... If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the ques-
tion becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 90 S. Ct. at 847, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 178.
430. See supra Part VII.B.
431. In essence, this example is based upon the facts present in County of
Martin, although the court there found that the flow control ordinance was pro-
tectionist and therefore, per se invalid. See County of Martin, 985 F.2d at 1385.
432. Ann R. Mesnikoff, Comment, Disposing of the Dormant Commerce
Clause Barrier: Keeping Waste at Home, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 1219 (1992) (noting
that the County of Martin decision has had significant repercussions in Minne-
sota). Counties are reassessing whether it is financially feasible without flow
control to install composting facilities, and one county put its composting plans
on hold fearing Commerce Clause litigation. Id. at 1241 n.107.
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If a new facility were to eliminate the need to export
waste, private haulers would have every incentive to tie up
the proposed recycling plant in extended Commerce Clause
litigation. Such litigation could not only stop a recycling and
composting project, but also result in an award of damages 433
and attorneys fees 434 against the municipality. Environmen-
tally progressive local government should not be faced with
such financially and politically draining litigation risks.
It should not be a revolutionary idea that backyard trash
does not necessarily involve interstate commerce. 435 It is
hard to believe that the Supreme Court had anything of the
sort in mind when it ruled in Philadelphia, and Fort Gra-
tiot.436 The Supreme Court in those cases was concerned
with the movement of garbage already in commerce, as part
of the country's burgeoning garbage trade.43 7 To classify lo-
cal waste as commerce protected by the dormant Commerce
Clause is to broaden the reach of Philadelphia and Fort Gra-
tiot far beyond anything which could have been imagined in
those cases, and result in dire consequences for the nation's
solid waste management.
433. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 111 S. Ct. 865, 112 L. Ed. 2d
969 (1991).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1989).
435. Yet most judges, lawyers and legal scholars who deal with garbage read
Philadelphia and its progeny as equating solid waste to interstate commerce.
See, e.g., Carbone, 182 A.D.2d at 222, 587 N.Y.S.2d at 686. "[It is now beyond
dispute that 'garbage' is an article of commerce within the meaning of the Com-
merce Clause of the United States Constitution." Id.
436. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617, 98 S. Ct. 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d 475 (1978); Fort
Gratiot, 504 U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d 139 (1992).
437. Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 617, 98 S. Ct. at 2531, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 475;
Fort Gratiot, 504 U.S. at -, 112 S. Ct. at 2019, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 139. Neverthe-
less, most commentators who support this view have proposed what they regard
as a necessary Congressional fix. See also Gold, supra note 302, at 21; Mes-
nikoff, supra note 432, at 1230-31; Kelly Outten, Waste to Energy: Environmen-
tal and Local Government Concerns, 19 U. RICH. L. REV. 373 (1985).
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B. A Congressional Solution Is Unnecessary if the
Supreme Court Uses a Principled Approach Allowing
Local Management of Local Waste
Federal legislation is unnecessary to correct what is re-
garded by many as an irreconcilable conflict between the dor-
mant Commerce Clause and essential waste management
activities performed by state and local governments. What is
needed is a principled constitutional interpretation which
recognizes that waste and pollution are fundamentally differ-
ent from commercial goods.
1. Import Bans
Since Philadelphia, there have been several congres-
sional proposals which would allow import bans and restric-
tions. Some of these proposed bills would authorize specific
state restrictions on interstate trade in waste haulage and
disposal, and often include outright bans and discriminatory
fees and taxes.438 Import bans indirectly promote, and ulti-
mately may compel, exporting jurisdictions to find waste dis-
posal solutions for indigenous waste. However, import bans
do this by denying the interstate waste trade its commerce in
waste. Such bans also have the potential for creating ex-
treme hardship in net waste export generating states.439 It
would be ironic indeed if Congress were to authorize import
bans at the same time the Supreme Court rules that munici-
palities lack the power to prohibit waste exports for the pur-
pose of managing local waste.
438. See, e.g., H.R. 2848, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1993). This bill, the Inter-
state Transportation of Municipal Waste Act of 1993, introduced on Aug. 3,
1993 by Rep. Philip Sharp, will allow governors the authority to impose impor-
tation disposal bans, import restrictions, and create landfill tonnage limita-
tions. Id. See also S. 2877, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1992) (authorizing import
freeze to 1991 or 1992 levels in some major importing states, restricting out-of-
state waste levels and banning out of state waste at some landfills).
439. Imagine the chaos that would result if no rural jurisdiction accepted
urban garbage. The cities would collapse from the weight of their trash, and
everyone would move to the country. Unless, of course, the movement of urban
people was also banned.
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The arguments put forth for allowing import restric-
tions44° are generally premised on the notion that a locality
should be allowed to preserve and restrict for its citizens local
waste facilities, such as landfills, even though these may be
privately owned. 441 This is a generally protectionist effort, 442
which tends to Balkanize the country by creating isolated
wastesheds.443 If, for example, New Jersey had been allowed
to bar Pennsylvania waste in 1978, then the converse may
have been the case in 1992 when New Jersey had become a
net exporter of waste.444
Import bans and restrictions are problematic, both le-
gally and practically. They also may create unsound econom-
ics. If states are allowed to charge an entry fee at their
border, some states (or foreign countries) may be willing
dumping grounds with ensuing garbage disposal price wars
and an incentive for minimal environmental protection in
440. See supra note 434.
441. Besides the dormant Commerce Clause issue, there may be other con-
stitutional issues involved with states or localities reserving locally-situated
business activities to local citizens. For example, the Fifth Amendment says no
person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CoNs'r. amend. V. It may be argued that public use of the private landfill's
property constitutes a "taking" which violates this amendment. Other constitu-
tional concerns are a denial of equal protection of the law and a violation of the
Privileges and Immunity Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, amend. XIV, § 1.
442. Arguably, these are not protectionist if the intent is to force neighboring
states to act responsibly and for them to internally manage their waste.
Although this is perhaps a "brotherly" approach, the intent is more likely pro-
tectionist, or at least "NIMBY" (not in my back yard).
443. Interstate Transportation of Solid Waste: Hearings Before The Subcom-
mittee on Transportation and Hazardous Materials, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1991) (testimony of Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator for Solid Waste and
Emergency Response).
444. Justice Stewart was prophetic in this regard when he wrote in his Phil-
adelphia majority decision:
Today, cities in Pennsylvania and New York find it expedient or
necessary to send their waste into New Jersey for disposal ....
Tomorrow, cities in New Jersey may find it expedient or necessary
to send their waste into Pennsylvania or New York .... The Com-
merce Clause will protect New Jersey in the future, just as it pro-
tects her neighbors now, from efforts by one State to isolate itself in
the stream of interstate commerce from a problem shared by all.
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629, 98 S. Ct. at 2538, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 485.
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these pollution havens. On the other hand, if disposal sites
become scarce, there arises the opportunity for monopolistic
or oligopolistic price gouging.
Most important, import restrictions simply do not ad-
dress (or only indirectly address) the core issue of how to re-
duce, reuse and otherwise properly manage solid waste.
Import bans and restrictions simply increase the costs of solid
waste disposal for states which are unwilling or unable to
manage their own waste. Additionally they grant a financial
windfall, in the form of import fees, to states which are will-
ing to accept waste by pandering landfill space.
2. Local Solid Waste Management: Export Bans
Legislative proposals allowing export bans are of recent
vintage, and are a result of recent court decisions invalidat-
ing state or municipal laws directing local waste to desig-
nated facilities.445 If the Supreme Court agrees with these
lower courts, as it is being asked to do by the garbage indus-
try in the Carbone case, local governments from around the
country which depend on flow control to supply waste to local
facilities will urgently seek a legislative fix. Such legislation,
if passed, may then need to be implemented at the state and
local levels accordingly. This could involve considerable time
and uncertainty, particularly with the powerful garbage in-
dustry lobbying, every step of the way, for minimal restric-
tions. Unless Congress makes the blanket statement that all
export flow control is permissible, the country may become
fragmented in its approach to solid waste management, with
strong industry efforts to privatize waste management wher-
ever profitable.446
445. See, e.g., H.R. 1357, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill was intro-
duced by Alex McMillan (R), representing North Carolina's 9th Congressional
District. The legislation would give states flow control authority over municipal
solid waste and may be granted to subdivisions of the state. However, the Con-
gressman feels passage is unlikely unless his proposal is combined with other
related issues in a larger bill, such as one granting a reprieve on RCRA Subtitle
D municipal waste landfill regulations or a proposal to place limitations on the
interstate transport of MSW (an import restriction).
446. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will not put the field of local solid waste
management into such disarray by prohibiting export flow control. If it does, it
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3. A Supreme Court Solution Will Solve the Crisis
This dire situation need not occur. Despite the urgings of
many commentators on the subject, a congressional solution
is neither required nor appropriate.447 What is required is a
principled interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme
Court and a judicial declaration that the Constitution does
not prohibit democratically-elected local government from
managing locally generated waste prior to the waste being
placed into commerce. Such a judicial declaration would be
immeasurably preferable to a legislative solution. A judicial
declaration allowing local waste management would be con-
sistent with both current federal law (i.e. RCRA), as well as
the relationship of the state, local and federal governments
under principles of federalism.448
This would be a prudential course for the Supreme
Court, since Congress does not need to change anything. Ex-
port barriers, including flow control and similar methods of
funneling local solid waste to municipal facilities, will allow
local management of the waste, yet at the same time, dis-
criminatory import restrictions will remain subject to strict
scrutiny or per se invalidity under Philadelphia and Fort
Gratiot. The Court can and should clearly distinguish be-
tween import restrictions, whereby the local body politic
seeks to isolate itself from the national garbage problem, and
export barriers where local voters responsibly choose to un-
dertake the burden of managing and disposing their own
waste.
will be a bonanza for lobbyists seeking corrective legislation from Congress, for
the legislators enacting corresponding laws at the state and local level, and for
the big law firms which will prosecute and defend lawsuits against municipal
management of local solid waste "on the back of interstate commerce." Ameri-
can taxpayers will pay a huge price for this chaos.
447. E.g., Gold, supra note 302, at 44-48; Meyers, supra note 306, at 567;
Hinshaw, supra note 302, at 511; Mesnikoff, supra note 432, at 1219.
448. As Justice Ginsburg said to the Senate Judiciary Committee during her
confirmation hearings, "we must always remember that we live in a democracy
that can be destroyed if judges take it upon themselves to rule as Platonic
guardians" who impose their own vision of wise government upon society.
Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 1993, at Al.
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IX. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has an opportunity to make a princi-
pled decision which is environmentally sound, economically
sensible, non-discriminatory, non-protectionist and consis-
tent with our democratic and federal system of government.
It should declare that municipally-managed waste is not an
article of interstate commerce and that in any event, local
government, under principles of federalism can democrati-
cally decide how to manage, reduce, recycle and eradicate its
solid waste without running afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause. Permitting local solid waste management is also con-
sistent with Congress' explicit deference to state and local
government as set forth in RCRA. The approach accords with
common sense and the basic democratic principle that citi-
zens should be able to control their own waste destiny.
Flow control is an effective, practical and non-discrimi-
natory tool for enabling a municipality to perform its tradi-
tional function of managing local waste. For Commerce
Clause purposes, flow control is no different from other
means of directing local waste to local facilities, such as mu-
nicipal collection, franchises or economic flow control. As to
waste which a municipality declines to manage, such be-
comes an article of commerce, with the protections enunci-
ated by the Supreme Court in Philadelphia and Fort Gratiot,
when placed by the municipality into the interstate garbage
market.
This home rule approach to waste will protect localities
against protectionism, yet enable local government to per-
form the paramount and essentially local function of solid
waste management. It will permit the only realistic solution
to the problem of escalating solid waste - the empowerment
of citizens to take responsibility for reducing, reusing, re-
cycling and eventually eradicating their own garbage.
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Appendix:
"Radical Recycling" Hypothetical
Scenario A - Village "Radical Recycling" Facility; waste
viewed as "article of commerce"
1. Village voters chose radical recycling facility with flow
control. HELD: Unconstitutional - deprives outsider gar-
bage industry of "article of commerce"
2. Village voters chose radical recycling with waste district
and no tip fee for residents. HELD: Unconstitutional -
same as above.
3. Village voters chose radical recycling with municipal col-
lection and delivery to village recycling facility. HELD: Un-
constitutional - same as above. ("Market participant
doctrine" inapplicable because of regulation of recyclables,
and because recyclables processing and resale market is dis-
tinct from collection market.)
Scenario B - "Congressional Fix"
1. Congress Authorizes Import Restrictions. Twenty states
implement total ban. Village chooses radical recycling fi-
nanced by franchising, flow control or municipal collection.
HELD: Same as above, because 30 other states accept waste,
and some have landfills with current costs less than
recycling.
2. Congress Authorizes Export Barriers (Flow Control).
State and Local governments can choose to implement. RE-
SULT: After two or more years of state and local lawmaking,
village can again decide whether to finance and construct
radical recycling facility for local waste. Private firms have
had two years to begin recycling "cream" of recyclables (e.g.,
aluminum) and plan Fifth Amendment "takings" or due pro-
cess challenge if village recycling facility intends to take alu-
minum and similar profitable items. Local solid waste plan
placed in limbo becomes outdated.
3. Congress Authorizes Both Import Restrictions and Ex-
port Bans. RESULT: Same as B.1 and B.2 above.
Scenario C - Supreme Court Validates Local Waste
Management
1. Village can immediately manage its waste, and begin
constructing recycling facility.
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2. Flow Control, Utility, Franchises, District, Authority,
Municipal Collection, all validated as legitimate means of
flowing local waste to local facilities. No risk of a Commerce
Clause violation and attendant 42 U.S.C. § 1988 attorney
fees.
3. Village need not worry that necessary police power waste
"regulation" may void what it planned as a "Market Partici-
pant" facility, because doctrine is unnecessary as implicated.
4. No "Congressional fix" required with attendant delays
and possible retroactivity issues.
5. Village can still freely export its processed, reduced and
recycled waste into interstate commerce, since Philadelphia
and its progeny still bar protectionist import restrictions by
other jurisdictions.
6. Village solution to local problem is consistent with
RCRA's deference to state and local government, the Tenth
Amendment, Garcia and state and local SWMPs.
7. Village's recycling approach can be immediately emu-
lated throughout the United States, if this experiment is suc-
cessful in the Village laboratory.
8. Village approach will be: democratic, close to the people,
non-discriminatory toward outsiders, environmentally and
economically sound, and is consistent with the "Golden Rule"
applied to waste management.
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